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Abstract
This thesis discusses the consequences of different institutional forms in 
various settings, with a particular focus on the interactions between insti­
tutions, cultural transmission, and public goods. Chapter 1 introduces the 
main ideas, motivation, and results of the subsequent chapters. It provides 
a detailed summary of the thesis. Chapter 2 considers how institutions that 
modify behaviors affect the transmission of cultural traits. It argues that they 
create an environment that crowds out the behavior they were trying to pro­
mote. When applied to a model of public good provisions it illustrates how 
institutions that reduce free riding may decrease the level of public good in 
the long run. Chapter 3 extends this framework to make institutions endoge­
nous. Individuals vote for their preferred institutional arrangement and the 
outcome is determined by majority voting. The crowding out of behaviors 
imply that agents have an incentive to affect strategically the transmission of 
preferences through collective socialization. Institutions can induce the for­
mation of additional institutions such as schools in order to guarantee their 
sustainability. Chapter 4 considers that children acquire preferences through 
the choice of friends in the population, and that parents try  to influence this 
choice. It shows how this creates a game between parents where their efforts to 
socialize their children to a particular cultural trait constitutes a public good. 
It studies the consequences for cultural groups of being intolerant and how 
they can survive cultural transmission. Chapter 5 uses the important example 
of commons as an institutional failure. It examines the case for privatization 
in an environment with different resources that may not be all privatized. It. 
shows that labor reallocation reduces the gains of privatization, potentially to 
the point of reducing welfare. First best institutions may fail in a second best 
environment.
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Chapter 1
Overview
Institutions are an important determinant of economic performance. They con­
strain individual choices and can promote welfare-enhancing behaviors, such as 
cooperation in games, altruism, strong reciprocity, or policies such as the pro­
vision of public goods. North (1990, p.3) states th a t "institutions are the rules 
of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction". Bowles (2004, p.47) similarly defines them as 
"the laws, informal rules, and conventions th a t give a durable structure to 
social interactions among the members of a population". These are crucial to 
enforce behaviors that unconstrained, or not fully informed individuals would 
not undertake. The economics literature has provided numerous examples of 
the impact of institutions on economic outcomes, not only theoretically but 
also using historical and econometric analysis (Greif 2006 provides a recent 
review of the main contributions).
By considering institutions as fixed rules (North 1990), part of the literature 
tries to understand how they influence behavior. This helps to appreciate the 
consequences of an exogenous change in institutions. A prominent example is 
the tragedy of the commons described by Hardin (1968). Individuals who do 
not coordinate their actions deplete the resource they depend upon. It is an
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institutional failure where the rules of the game are not "right". Institutions 
which create property rights by privatizing the resource avert the tragedy and 
increase welfare. The focus in this literature is on the outcomes generated by 
two different institutional forms. The last chapter of this thesis places itself 
in this perspective and addresses the issue of the commons by assessing how 
apparently inefficient institutional arrangements can be justified in a second 
best world.
However this perspective of exogenous rules is ill-equipped to apprehend 
the emergence, persistence, and change of institutions. Greif (2006) argues 
that we must understand the processes through which institutions reinforce 
or undermine themselves. Institutions influence their own future by changing 
individuals’ behaviors. Chapters 2 , 3, and 4 relate to this idea and present dif­
ferent theoretical studies to explain these mechanisms by focusing on cultural 
transmission.
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis, and provides a summary of 
each of its sections.
1.1 Intergenerational crowding out
Chapter 2 is a first step towards the understanding of the processes through 
which institutions can ensure the pereniality of what they were designed to 
promote. It considers that constraints put on individual choices by institutions 
determine the evolution of preferences in the society. It investigates in an 
example the consequences of this shift in constraints for behaviors, but not 
for institutions. So strictly speaking this chapter still looks at institutions as 
fixed and exogenous entities. However it argues that institutions designed to 
promote a behavior can lead do its unraveling in the long run and as such looks 
at a changing environment that affects economic outcomes. There is only a
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small step from this conclusion to the dynamics of institutional change. If 
an institutional constraint fails to fulfill its goal to the point that it becomes 
irrelevant and obsolete, people may vote to remove it, or revolt against it, in 
order to design new rules.
An important field of economics has already studied the dynamics of insti­
tutions. Evolutionary institutionalism assumes that individuals are not fully 
rational and take decisions based on limited knowledge. They learn from exper­
imentation by interacting with other agents. Institutions, as a stable pattern 
of expectations and beliefs, are shaped by these evolutionary forces (Young 
1998). I depart from this line of research by studying the evolution of prefer­
ences, instead of behaviors and expectations. The distribution of preferences 
in the population then determines behaviors, but the dynamics are created by 
the transmission of preferences. Bisin and Verdier (2001) have developed an 
economic model of cultural transmission that I extend and rely on in Chapters 
2 and 3.
Bisin and Verdier (2001) model assumes that preferences are not inherited 
genetically, or by conformism (Bowles 2004 provides examples of both). They 
claim instead that cultural traits are acquired through a process of socialization 
initiated by parents. These evaluate their children’s actions and decide how to 
socialize them. This choice depends on the environment and is made through 
the lens of paternalistic altruism whereby parents use their own preferences 
to evaluate their children’s behavior. Consider a society where individuals 
have different cultural values, in the form of different preferences. Cultural 
transmission can be seen as a two step process after the birth of the naive 
child. First, the parent tries to socialize his child to a cultural trait, and 
this action is costly. This constitutes the vertical transmission, and takes 
place inside the family. If the parent is successful then his child adopts the 
preferences corresponding to the cultural trait. If he fails, the child is randomly
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paired to an adult in the population, and takes his preferences. This is the 
oblique transmission, and takes place outside of the family. The vertical and 
oblique channels provide transition probabilities for given socialization efforts. 
Aggregation of parents’ decisions yields the dynamics of preferences.
The main result of the chapter comes from how parents choose to social­
ize their children, so I give a detailed, albeit very simplified, account of their 
decision rule here. Consider that there are two types of agents in the soci­
ety, with respective utility functions ua(x) and Ub(x). Adults choose x  that 
maximizes their utility function, and the optimal choice for type a and type 
b agents is respectively denoted x a and x^. The cultural transmission mech­
anism implies probabilities for the child of a parent of either type to adopt 
either type of preferences. Let P lj be the probability that a child of a type 
i parent becomes a type j  agent, with i, j  £ {a, b}. Type i parents choose 
their socialization effort n  maximizing PnUi(xi) -f P^Ui(xj)  — C  (T j), where 
C (ri) is the cost of effort. Parents are altruistic but biased because they use 
their own preferences to evaluate their children’s actions. This maximization 
(under suitable assumptions) implies that socialization effort increases with 
the difference Ui(xi) — Ui(xj). The intuition is clear: a large gap in utility from 
parents’ point in view between being a type i and a type j  means that they 
should invest heavily in socialization. That can be summarized by saying that 
intolerance intensify efforts to transmit cultural traits.
How can we formally include institutions in this set-up? I gave a definition 
of institutions as entities that devise constraints and shape human interactions. 
I assume that institutions constrain individuals’ choices x. For instance, the 
two types could be labeled as cooperative and selfish and decide how much to 
contribute to a public good, with cooperative agents giving a higher contri­
bution to the public good than selfish agents. The institutional arrangements 
would consist for instance in a fine for giving a too low contribution. This con­
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straint forces selfish agents to participate more to the public good than they 
would otherwise do. Institutions do not necessarily impose material penal­
ties, it could also be social stigma associated to a behavior, or punishment by 
forbidding future interactions with the agent, etc.
The question the chapter addresses is whether an institution that promotes 
a behavior makes it sustainable in the long run. The perspective adopted is 
close to what Greif (2006) argues to be important to understand institutional 
change. He claims that we should "study the interplay between micromech­
anisms through which institutions influence behavior and their implications", 
and "how an institution cultivates the seeds of its own demise". I make use 
of the fact that institutions affect behaviors, which in turn change cultural 
transmission and so the prevalence of traits in the population, and that this 
eventually feeds back to behaviors. While I am not the first to attempt such 
an exercise (see Bisin and Verdier 2004 who study the implication of cultural 
transmission on welfare state, and particularly Francois 2006 who looks at the 
dynamics of institution formation), the result that institutions may "cultivate 
the seeds of [their] own demise" through cultural transmission is, up to my 
knowledge, new to the literature.
To understand this result, come back to the preceding public good example, 
and consider that there is an (exogenous) institutional change that induces 
selfish agents to increase their participation to the public good, in such a way 
that contributions of both types are now closer. The effect on socialization 
effort is usually that they fall. The intuition is that parents feel less intolerant 
towards a behavior close to theirs. After the institutional change cooperative 
parents are in an environment where everyone looks "more cooperative" than 
before, because even selfish agents now contribute a lot to the public good. 
Parents make a smaller effort to transmit their preferences because even if their 
children adopt selfish preferences, their behavior will not be that far from a
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cooperative behavior. Less investment in socialization means that cooperative 
preferences are less transmitted, and so that there are fewer cooperative agents 
next period. The confidence in the present environment is what may make the 
society evolve towards one with a large number of selfish agents.1 The result 
we reached is the following: if institutions are built to promote public good 
provision, they may lead to a society where most people contribute very little. 
I call this property intergenerational crowding out. This counterintuitive result 
occurs because the promoted behavior becomes very common, such that people 
do not invest in the transmission of preferences that sustain it.
I now illustrate this property of cultural transmission with some examples. 
The first one is developed in Chapter 2  and is directly related to the public 
good provision example used here. Individuals can be cooperative or selfish 
but in addition they interact with a group of peers that influence their contri­
bution decision. A selfish agent interacting only with copperative individuals 
contributes more than if he interacted only with selfish agents. Institutions 
shape these interactions by affecting their importance in decision making be­
cause they modify the cost of departing from the behaviors of one’s peers. For 
instance institutions may make contributions either public information, and 
agents suffer a large utility loss from looking selfish, or keep contributions pri­
vate, and agents do not take into account the decisions of their peers. The 
model is designed such that, everything else being equal, stronger interactions 
imply a larger provision of public good.2 Institutionally it seems a good idea to 
reinforce these interactions. However I show that in the long run it unambigu­
ously leads to a smaller proportion of cooperative agents in the population, 
and, somewhat more importantly, that it may result in lower levels of pub-
1 Parents have rational expectations and so the confidence is rational. Individuals are not 
surprised by what happens next period and their confidence is perfectly justified. However 
repeated on a large number of periods it slowly erodes public good provision.
2 Stronger interactions mean that the individual prefers his behavior to be closer to his 
peers’ behaviors.
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lie good. An institutional rule supposed to support public good provision is 
successful in the short run, but fails in the long run. That reasoning can be 
applied to different issues. One is the level of trust between individuals in 
the US. Individuals exhibit stable trust levels over their life cycle, but trust 
has dramatically fallen between generations during the last century. As docu­
mented by Putnam (2000), people born around 1930 were more civic than their 
elders, and than their subsequent offsprings. Intergenerational crowding out 
suggests that the upsurge in civic attitudes caused their own decline. Similar 
examples are discussed in Chapter 2 , but I casually offer here an additional 
application of the model. The interaction between welfare state and the evo­
lution of preferences has already been studied (Lindbeck, Nyberg and Weibull 
1999, Bisin and Verdier 2004) but intergenerational crowding out highlights a 
new feature that could explain the present tensions in various countries about 
the generosity of welfare state systems. These were mainly established at the 
peak of the "civic generation" when one could argue that some incentives com­
patibility constraints were satisfied because of civic mindedness (basically, not 
cheating, or claim undue benefits). This cultural trait was present because 
it gave some advantage before the welfare state provided a systematic safety 
net, by sustaining cooperation, or reciprocity in a risky environment. Welfare 
state made individual economic outcomes less related to civic attitudes, as it 
compensated for bad outcomes. In this environment the civic cultural trait has 
been less transmitted, increasing the proportion of people relying on benefits. 
The welfare state system is weakened by this change of attitudes, and many 
countries now focus on ways to control benefit claims and make sure incentive 
compatibility constraints are satisfied. This long run evolution corresponds to 
what Greif (2006) calls an undermining institution.
Intergenerational crowding out is the main result of Chapter 2 , but it also 
brings new developments to the theory of cultural transmission. It includes in
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particular social interactions into preferences. This requires a formal extension 
of Bisin and Verdier (2001) to show how it affects their equilibrium conditions, 
and can generate multiple equilibria. Apart from the theoretical argument, it 
underlines how interactions can make steady states dependent on past history 
in the cultural transmission framework. I illustrate in the public good example 
how the composition of peer group is crucial to understand how public good 
provision changes with stronger interactions. This motivates future research 
to understand the link between peer choice and cultural transmission, and 
possible implications, among others, for residential choice and neighborhood 
segregation, or society polarization into culturally homogeneous groups.
In this chapter I considered that institutions were exogenously given, and 
examined the implications of different institutional settings. The next chapter 
builds on these results to understand the change in institutions.
1.2 Institu tional crowding out
Chapter 3 directly uses the conclusions of Chapter 2 to endogenize institutions. 
It considers a case where there is intergenerational crowding out and investi­
gates its implications in a model with voting. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2004) 
also look at a political equilibrium in a cultural transmission framework. How­
ever their results hold precisely because there is no intergenerational crowding 
out. Francois (2006) is also closely related to this chapter. Although he does 
not consider voting, he looks at the simultaneous evolution of institutions, and 
norms. He claims, as a result of his model, that good institutions make good 
agents, and that good agents are also a requirement for good institutions to 
arise. Chapter 3 somehow challenges the first affirmation. Intergenerational 
crowding out implies that good institutions may not make good agents, but
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may substitute for good agents to the point of not being sustainable.
The argument is a direct consequence of Chapter 2, and it can be exposed 
using the public good model with cooperative and selfish agents. Instead of 
having exogenous institutions, individuals choose institutions in each period. 
The outcome is determined by majority voting. Assume that selfish agents 
vote for institutions that make their contributions low (they may not benefit 
from the public good, and so decide to scrap the institutional arrangements 
ensuring a minimum contribution from each type), while cooperative agents 
opt for some enforcing mechanisms that make selfish agents’ contributions 
high. Assume in addition that there is an extreme case of intergenerational 
crowding out, whereby the steady state distribution of preferences with the 
"selfish" institutions implies that cooperative agents represent a majority, and 
a minority with the "cooperative" institutions. As a consequence none of these 
steady states exists, because of majoritarian voting. More disturbingly, I show 
that there is no rational expectations paths as agents are bound to be wrong 
in their expectations. If agents believe that institutions next period will be 
"selfish" then they are "cooperative", and reciprocally. The decision problem 
cannot be solved at the individual level, as long as agents have rational ex­
pectations. It requires some degree of coordination between individuals. This 
dilemma exists because agents do not take into account the consequences of 
their own socialization choice on the dynamics of preferences. One way for 
individuals to make rationally consistent choices is to coordinate, that is to 
build some device to act as a group. A collective institution of preference for­
mation (schools, state education, ideology) would emerge to solve the decision 
puzzle. This provides a rationale for collective socialization: it allows rational 
expectations paths to exist. Bisin and Verdier (2000) also study this issue but 
they find that institutions emerge when it allows a cultural trait to thrive in 
an environment where it would otherwise disappear. While the same effect
20
is present in my model, there is a second complementary argument: when 
an institution produces intergenerational crowding out, agents can organize 
themselves to decide collectively about socialization in order to have rational 
beliefs. People do realize that their beliefs are not supported by their actions 
and consequently decide to act collectively.
The model also shows that when agents are able to set up such collective 
institutions they do so only for not too small minorities, and small majorities. 
Collective socialization is not a profitable option for a group whose size is 
too small, or too large. For intermediate sizes agents organize themselves 
to affect cultural transmission. If they represent a minority, it is to be a 
majority next period. This is feasible only if they are not a small minority. 
If they are already majoritarian (but not by a large quantity), it is to still 
be next period. This acts as a counteracting force to crowding out. Thus 
this chapter extends the model of Chapter 2  by recognizing that individuals 
shape institutions, as much as institutions shape individuals. It continues to 
offer an illustration of the mechanisms of institutional change described by 
Greif (2006). Institutions modify behaviors, and that reinforces or undermines 
themselves. Crowding out is an undermining process. According to Greif this 
dynamic process makes the institutions more or less stable when confronted 
to a new environment. In the model institutions indirectly change cultural 
group sizes and it makes the institutional arrangement not viable because not 
supported by the majority. However this undermining can be avoided if the 
initial institution is complemented by a collective socialization institution. A 
general conclusion of this chapter is that institutions crowd themselves out, 
but may come to realize this when on the brink of falling apart and maintain 
conditions for their existence. According to this argument public education 
can be seen as a collective device in order to support rules that make existing 
institutions viable.
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1.3 C ultural transm ission through network for­
m ation
In Chapter 2 and 3 the transmission of preferences follows the Bisin and Verdier 
(2 0 0 1 ) model that uses vertical transmission and then oblique transmission but 
only if the child has not been socialized vertically. Children are merely passive 
and do not play any role in this process. Furthermore they are influenced by 
other adults only if their parents fail to socialize them. Chapter 4 relaxes this 
assumption and makes both parents and children actors in the transmission 
of preferences. It assumes that children build a network of friends and that 
they are influenced by them in the socialization process. Parents anticipate 
this and try to influence their choice of friends by altering the cost of building 
network links. Unlike Bisin and Verdier (2001), vertical transmission does not 
result directly in socialization to a cultural trait, but more subtly shape the 
environment to make oblique transmission favorable to parents. The assump­
tion that parents are imperfectly altruistic is maintained. The way parents 
influence network formation can be through residential choice in a segregated 
area, or school choice. These come at a cost for parents. An important fea­
ture of the model is that children may not be able to build the network that 
maximizes their utility. Friendship requires the consent of both children who 
take part in the relationship. If one child has already built his optimal network 
he does not desire to have further friends, and the other is constrained in his 
choice. Consequently parents may not have to exert costly effort if they know 
that their child is going to be constrained in his friendships. To understand 
this consider the extreme case of a population made of a highly predominant 
cultural group, and of a very small minority. Children from the largest group 
cannot find many friends from the very small community, simply because there
22
are very few. It is likely that they will not be able to build their desired net­
work of friends, but in that case their parents should not worry about affecting 
network formation. On the other hand parents from the minority group are 
surrounded by individuals with different preferences, and they know that their 
children will always be able to find as many friends as they want from the 
majority group. These parents are therefore willing to spend resources (time, 
money, etc.) to limit the number of friendships. This creates a game between 
parents, where it is always in the interest of one cultural group not to make 
any effort to curb their children’s friendships. Socialization is a public good 
and the group which values it most provides it, while the other free rides.
I show that the game in socialization efforts does not always have a unique 
Nash equilibrium. When it is not unique cultural groups disagree on which 
should be implemented: each group prefers the equilibrium where it free rides 
on the other. In order to study the dynamics of preferences in the population, 
I assume that the equilibrium is chosen by majority voting. I study first the 
outcome of the political process in each generation and how it depends on the 
intolerance of each group towards the other. It appears that the most intolerant 
group always sees its preferred equilibrium implemented. In this sense one 
can claim that intolerance confers an advantage. However this comes at a 
cost: everything else being equal parents’ welfare increases with the intolerance 
of parents from the other cultural group. It is always better to face a very 
intolerant group because it allows free riding for a larger range of group sizes. 
Finally, the political process not only selects the equilibrium preferred by the 
majority, but it also affects the existence of steady states. It may eliminate 
Nash equilibria that would be steady states, if not for the majority voting. It 
can result in a situation without any steady states because the majority never 
votes for them. That creates cycles between states with alternating majorities.
One could expect that intolerance is not welfare improving, but that it has
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an evolutionary advantage. More intolerant groups are better able to preserve 
their cultural traits by limiting external contacts. This is only partly true. 
Intolerance avoids damaging contacts with other cultures but it also prevents 
conversion of children from families of different cultures. The most intolerant 
group may not survive cultural transmission, however this happens only if its 
children establish only a small number of links in their own cultural group. 
An intolerant and poorly internally connected group is bound to disappear, 
whereas a similar group with the same intolerance level but with numerous 
internal connections does survive evolutionary pressures. This result sheds 
some light on how cultural groups can organize to reproduce themselves. It 
helps to understand how institutions specific to each group play a crucial role 
in the dynamics of culture. Institutions should underline the importance of 
the internal group structure, and focus on intragroup friendships. This always 
increases group size in steady state. On the other hand, to reinforce intolerance 
is usually not a solution, and can even lead to the death of the cultural group.
1.4 Com m on property resource privatization  
and labor allocation
The tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968) is a famous example of institu­
tional failure. Common resources are overexploited because of their lack of 
clearly defined property rights and it is argued that privatization, by defin­
ing these, would avert the tragedy and restore the first best outcome. This 
logic has been criticized on different grounds. Weitzman (1974) shows that 
privatization reduces the return to labor, and that labor must be made worse 
off. This result has been used recently by Baland and Francois (2005). They 
show that commons offer insurance properties that cannot be replicated after
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privatization, because of incomplete markets, such that the commons Pareto 
dominate private property. Chapter 5 considers the effect of a privatization 
reform on labor allocation, and welfare. The motivation comes from Jodha 
(1985, 1995). He observes that following the privatization of common prop­
erty resources due to a change in institutions in India, the remaining commons 
are congested and dangerously depleted. Furthermore workers have seen their 
wages fall. The model described in the chapter considers two resources. One is 
privatized while the other is common property. One can think of two different 
situations that the model illustrates. First, some land that is privatized, while 
the surrounding forest, more difficult to privatize, is commonly exploited. Sec­
ond, the agricultural land is privatized, and individuals can migrate to a labor 
market where they are employed. The important feature of the model is that 
the outside opportunity after the land has been privatized is congested.
Following Weitzman (1974), privatization reduces labor allocation, and as a 
result shifts workers to their outside (congested) opportunity. First, the return 
to labor on the privatized resource falls. Second, the return to labor on the 
congested resource falls as well. In equilibrium these returns must be equal, 
such that workers lose twice: first because of privatization, second because of 
congestion. I show that under these conditions welfare can fall, even though 
there used to be a full tragedy of the commons, and the reform is perfectly 
egalitarian.
The model is then extended to include heterogeneity in skills with respect 
to the privatized resource. Individuals are more or less talented and I study 
the consequences of reform design on incomes and welfare. Land can be given 
to the most skilled agents because they have a larger labor demand, or a more 
egalitarian reform can be implemented. It appears that welfare is maximized 
when only the most able individuals receive some land. Finally the article 
draws some conclusions on the distribution of skills. The model is an illustra-
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tion of the second best theorem where a first best reform may not be beneficial 
in a non first best environment. Good institutions (private property rights) 





In his book Bowling Alone (2000), Robert D. Putnam documents the loss of 
social capital in the American community. Using a wide range of indicators, 
he shows how pedple in the US are less and less civically engaged. Life-cycle 
effects do not account for this pattern, while intergenerational differences ap­
pear to be dramatic. Social capital has declined not because individuals have 
changed over their lifetime but because generations have. In the words of 
Putnam "all these forms of civic involvement and more besides have declined 
largely, if not exclusively, because of the inexorable replacement of a highly 
civic generation by others that are much less so" (p. 250). He identifies a 
"long civic generation" born between 1910 and 1940 that has been followed 
by cohorts whose contributions to social capital have decreased continuously. 
Indicators of trust, volunteering, organization membership, and voting turnout 
have declined over time. Figure 2 .1  uses data about trust from the General 
Social Survey to illustrate this fall across cohorts. Age seems to have a much 
smaller influence, as trust is pretty stable over the lifetime. Using the same 
data and controlling for various individual characteristics, Glaeser et al. (2000)
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Source: General Social Survey 1972-2004
Year
■Bom before 1944 
■ Bom 1945-1959 
Bom after 1960
Figure 2.1: Trust over time, by cohort
indicate that the gap in the level of trust between individuals born before 1915 
and those born after 1959 is larger than 20 percent and find an insignificant 
effect of age. Robinson and Jackson (2001) provide an analysis of trust by 
cohorts in the US and confirm the finding that successive generations are less 
and less trusting.
According to Putnam (2000) all the decline in voting in the US can be 
explained by generational change. He reports that only 54 percent of adults 
born in the seventies feel guilty when they do not vote, as compared with 
over 70 percent of the older generations. 1 Miller (1992) demonstrates that 
the change in the US turnout is due to generational change and that young 
generations vote less than their parents, who themselves vote more than their 
parents. Intergenerational changes are a common feature in social sciences
1 While the methodology and conclusions of Putnam have not remained unchallenged (see 
Durlauf 2002 and Sobel 2002), authors agree that he provided convincing data on the decline 
of participation in voluntary organizations in the US. The results about voting have been 
extensively confirmed and had been established before Putnam’s book.
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and are observed for a large range of characteristics by sociologists. However 
the lacuna in this research is a general framework to understand why these 
transformations occur. Incentives have certainly evolved but it is less clear 
why these changes would affect cohabiting cohorts differently. In this chapter 
I use an economic model of cultural transmission from parents to children to 
show how widespread attitudes create an environment that leads to their own 
demise. Parents fail to transmit a common behavior simply because it is too 
common.
In order to spell out this mechanism I use a model of cultural transmis­
sion developed by Bisin and Verdier (2001), where the cultural trait to be 
transmitted are the preferences for a certain behavior. To address the issue of 
intergenerational change I extend this model to allow for social interactions. 
It has two consequences: first it generates multiple equilibria and this may 
explain large differences between otherwise similar societies; second, it creates 
a link between individuals and with who they interact. Peer groups depend 
on what types of individuals are in the population and this is determined by 
cultural transmission. Therefore interactions establish a connection between 
individual choices and cultural transmission.
I characterize how a policy or an exogenous institutional shock has unin­
tended consequences in the long run such that it is crowded out. The mech­
anism is that when behaviors become more homogeneous across individuals, 
parents put less effort into transmitting their own preferences: from what they 
observe any preferences lead to a similar behavior. Parents therefore neglect 
that preferences drive choices. This ’’neglect effect” in education ultimately 
leads to the decline of these preferences and it affects their population distri­
bution. Finally individual choices respond to this new distribution through 
interactions. When the new equilibrium is eventually reached, behaviors and 
the distribution of preferences have changed. Using utility functions satisfying
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standard assumptions I show that crowding out is a general result for cultural 
transmission models based on Bisin and Verdier (2001). The endogenization of 
preferences allows me to disentangle the short run from the long run effect of 
changing incentives. The driving force leading to crowding out is the increased 
similarity between behaviors after incentives have been applied, and social in­
teractions. To my knowledge, this model is the first to introduce explicit social 
interactions in a cultural transmission framework.
The exogenous shock assumption should not be taken too literally. The 
main point of the model is to study the long run outcome of different institu­
tional arrangements characterized as constraints on behaviors. The crowding 
out result demonstrates that short and long run objectives are contradictory. 
Institutions that effectively promote a behavior in the short run have opposite 
consequences in the long run. There is a slow but ineluctable erosion of the 
values the institution supported in the first place. Institutional constraints 
make behaviors similar across types of preferences, but this comes at the cost 
of making the transmission of values less compelling since the institution pro­
vides the right constraints. Institutions potentially fail to foster the behavior 
which they were designed for and this clearly challenges their sustainability. 
The important study of how this creates pressure for institutional change is 
done in Chapter 3.
I apply this model to study the dynamics of voluntary contribution to a 
public good. Volunteering, voting, church attendance and trust usually suffer 
from underinvestment, free riding and are, to a certain extent, non rival. A 
public good model captures these characteristics. The population is divided 
into two types: conditional and strong cooperators. Cooperative individuals 
follow an internal norm, such that they are insensitive to the distribution of 
types in the society. These could be described as ethical, or strong coopera­
tors. The rest of the population is composed of conditional cooperators whose
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contributions are driven by conformity to their reference group contributions. 
I show first that cultural transmission decrease a strong cooperators’ popu­
lation size when conditional cooperators contribute more because of a higher 
concern for conformity. Second, I investigate how the composition of the group 
individuals interact with determine the equilibrium provision of public good. I 
show that to reduce the differences between contributions is counterproductive 
and detrimental to the level of public good. This suggests that a split society 
with an elite, following its own internal norm, can exhibit higher levels of co­
operation than an egalitarian society. Conformity has only short run benefits 
that may be cancelled out by cultural transmission.
This work is related to a growing literature on cultural transmission (see 
Bisin and Verdier (forthcoming) for a recent survey). However these contribu­
tions do not specifically look at the effects of incentives, and do not underline 
the opposition between beneficial short run effects and long run consequences, 
partly because they do not allow for interactions. My work also has connec­
tions with the vast literature on social interactions (see Brock and Durlauf 
2001, Glaeser and Scheinkman 2003) where an individual decision is depen­
dent on the decisions made by his peers. Interaction models characterize a 
static equilibrium that individuals can reach through some class of dynamics. 
This article, rather than solving for a static equilibrium and then to think of 
how people can reach it, provides the microfoundations for the dynamics in 
the presence of interactions and then characterize the equilibrium.
The crowding out of norms is now well documented in micro studies (Prey 
1997 and Benabou and Tirole 2006 provide surveys) following the work of 
Gneezy and Rusticchini (2000). In this literature crowding out takes place 
because extrinsic incentives cast doubt on the real motives of an action. The 
mechanism underfilled in this chapter is very different since individuals do not 
have any reputational concerns but care about transmitting preferences to the
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next generation.
Finally, generational change and the decline of values is a popular theme 
that has not received any attention from the economics literature. Putnam
(2000) and Fukuyama (1999) document these changes in the US after the 
Second World War. Putnam ’s book initiated a large literature on social capital. 
Its fall has been confirmed and its causes evaluated by Costa and Kahn (2003). 
The importance of social capital for growth has been documented in a cross­
country study by Knack and Keefer (1997). The literature on institutions and 
on how they create the conditions of their demise has been reviewed in Chapter 
1 .
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 gives 
the details of the general model. It must first extend the Bisin and Verdier
(2001) model to incorporate social interactions. It shows that crowding out 
is a general property. Section 2.3 uses a simple model to illustrate the result 
and looks at the effect of interaction on the average behavior in the society. 
Section 2.4 provides related evidence that fit into the framework of the model. 
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 A  general m odel
This section shows how crowding out occurs in a general overlapping genera­
tions model with cultural transmission process. There are two types of agents 
identified by i € (1,2}. Each agent has to choose an action a* and he is influ­
enced in his choice by a weighted average Si of the actions of a group of peers. 
All the type i agents have the same utility function U% and the same structure 
of peer groups. I consider only symmetric equilibria, such that in equilibrium 
Si can be written St =  7 a ai 4- 7 *2^2 , where 7 il? > 0 , +  j i2 = 1 and
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a,i and «2  are the equilibrium actions. The weights represent the importance 
given to type i individuals actions in the peer group. Because of the dynamic 
nature of the model these weights depend on the proportions of each type in 
the population. Interactions, and so the weights given to different types, evolve 
with population characteristics. A simple example is when individuals have a 
reference equal to the average action in the society.
Agents choose the action ai(Si,a) that maximizes Ul(ai, Si, a) for a given 
Si, a  being a vector of parameters that will be affected by institutions .2 Con­
cavity of utility in a* {U\x < 0) implies that there is a well defined solution to 
this problem. Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) give conditions for existence and 
uniqueness of equilibrium for this type of model. In particular there is a unique
U,2(ai>Siia)
(aiiSi-,Ot') < 1 . MSIequilibrium under moderate social influence (MSI), i.e. 
is assumed to be satisfied in the rest of the chapter. I also usually assume 
strategic complementarity U\2 >  0 , as is common in models of interactions, 
such that there is complementarity between individual and reference group 
actions.
I assume that Si is a continuously differentiable function of actions and 
proportions, such that it can be written as Si =  Si{a\, a2,p), with p being the 
proportion of type 1 agents in the population. The dependence on p is made 
through the weight 7 . In this article I allow for all kinds of interactions that 
boil down to a weighted average. It is not useful at this point to specify the 
function 7  but, as we will see in the next sections, it affects the equilibrium 
properties.
2Institutions ant as constraints on individuals when they maximize their utility. This is 
represented by the parameter a.
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2.2 .1  E d u cation  choice  
C ultural transm ission  m echanism
In this section we integrate the static setting into an overlapping-generations 
model with continuous time. In each period the proportion of agents with 
type i preferences is p\. Agents are born and die following a Poisson process. 
The size of the population is therefore constant. During a time interval dt, a 
proportion A dt of all individuals die. Just before dying, they give birth to a 
child without any preferences who is instantaneously socialized into one of two 
traits. Socialization is a product of the family (what Bisin and Verdier (2001) 
call vertical transmission) and of the social environment (oblique transmission). 
Parents are altruistic towards their children and want to socialize them to the 
preferences that increase their welfare. However, they use their own subjective 
evaluation that may differ from their children utility.
I follow the Bisin and Verdier (2001) model in this section but, contrary 
to their model, I let agents interact: actions depend on reference groups. This 
extension has not been formally discussed in the literature. I am therefore able 
to give stronger conditions for what they define as "cultural substitution".
Education is done in the following way: a naive child is educated by his 
parents, say of type i , with probability di{p\). This defines the probability 
with which vertical transmission is successful, such that the child takes on the 
parent’s type. Otherwise, he remains naive and is matched randomly with an 
individual in the population. He adopts his trait through oblique transmission. 
In other words, when the family fails to socialize the child, he is influenced by 
a role model (friend, teacher, peer, etc.) chosen randomly in the population.
Let Pi3 denote the probability that a child from a family with type i pref­
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erences is socialized to cultural trait j ,  then
Pi* = + [1 -  4(pJ)] Pl ^  = [1 -  d(pi)} (1 -  pi) (2.1)
where Pf1 is computed in the following way: with probability d(p\) vertical 
transmission succeeds and the child adopts trait i . If education fails then he 
can still adopt type i preferences by being matched with a random individual 
who is type i. This occurs with probability [1 — d(pl)} p\.
Pt+dt is given by:
PUdt = Pl( 1 "  Adi) +  AdtplP? +  Xdt(l -  pi)P?  (2.2)
Using (2 .1 ), and dt —* 0 (the time index is dropped for notational clarity), 
(2 .2 ) becomes
j f  = Ap4(l -  p ^ W )  -  dj( 1 -  p*)) (2.3)
I define cultural substitution as in Bisin and Verdier (2001).
D efinition: Vertical cultural transmission and oblique cultural transmis­
sion are cultural substitutes for agent i (or, equivalently, di{p%) satisfies the 
cultural substitution property) i f  d^p1) is a continuous, strictly decreasing func­
tion in p1, and, moreover, di(l) =  0 .
Bisin and Verdier show that when vertical and oblique cultural transmission 
are cultural substitutes for both groups, then 0 , 1 , and p1* are stationary states 
of (2.3), with 0 < p1* < 1, and p1* is stable, with its basin of attraction being 
(0,1). The next section gives a sufficient condition for cultural substitution.
E ndogenous education  choice
In this section di(pl) is chosen endogenously. We want to identify conditions 
under which there is cultural substitutability since it ensures stability of the
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interior equilibrium. Parents evaluate their children’s actions and then try 
to socialize them into their own trait. V lj is the utility a parent of type i 
derives from having a child of type j .  Two things differentiate this frame­
work from Bisin and Verdier (2001): first, they assume imperfect empathy, 
i.e. V lj =  Uz(a j,S i,a )y such that parents evaluate the actions of their child 
using their own preferences. I do not impose such structure on VtJ’, but in­
stead consider the general case where V lj = V l{dj, Si, a). Second, since agents 
interact V lj is a function of Si, and so indirectly of p%. Peer groups evolve with 
p%. This distinction is important as it potentially generates multiple equilibria 
and introduces instability in the dynamics.
Parents of type i have to choose a vector r* € R" of inputs to educate their 
children. These inputs and the proportion of types in the population determine 
the probability for parents i to have a child of their own type according to the 
map D : R+ x [0,1] —> [0,1],
di =  D (ri,p<) (2.4)
Education has a cost C(ri). C  and D satisfy the assumptions found in 
Bisin and Verdier:
• D is C2, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-concave in n .  D(0,p%) =  0, 
Vpf G[0 ,l].
• C is C2, strictly increasing and strictly quasi-convex. C(0) =  0  and
C,(0) =  0.
Dropping the time subscripts, parents choose 7 * G [0, lj maximizing
p i i y i i  +  p i j y i j  _  (2 .5)
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Parents have rational expectations and so perfectly anticipate the new a* 
and the proportion of type 1 agents next period.
The solution to the maximization of (2.5) is given by a continuous map 
di =  d (p \A i), where A* =  V n — V %i measures the intolerance of parents 
towards the other trait. While I assume A* > 0 in the general proof to rule 
out special cases, one could imagine situations where parents actually prefer 
their child to adopt the other cultural trait. In this case their optimal education 
effort would be zero.
Bisin and Verdier show that the probability of success of vertical trans­
mission d(pl, Aj) satisfies the cultural substitution property if the "vertical 
transmission technology" is decreasing with p% dD^ l P  ^ <  0. When A* de­
pends on p% this is not true any more, and a stronger condition is required. 
Let rjA. be the elasticity of A* with respect to p7, rjA. =
P ro p o sitio n  2 . 1  d(p \A i) satisfies the cultural substitution property if dD^ i P  ^
0  and ?7a . > —1 .
The Bisin and Verdier result that dD^ p  ^ <  0 implies a stable interior 
equilibrium no longer holds. Consider an equilibrium and then increase slightly 
pl. When Ai does not depend on p \  then the equilibrium is stable if type i 
parents reduce their education effort, while type j  parents increase theirs. In 
practice, type i parents reduce their effort when p1 increases because they can 
rely on oblique transmission. In other words if they fail to educate their child, 
he is likely to be educated by the society. It brings back the system to its 
former equilibrium. This is the intuition behind dD(Qp?  ^ < 0.
But if A* is a function of p \  the perturbation directly affects intolerance. 
If, for instance, type i parents become much more intolerant because of the fall 
in p7 (implying rjA. < — 1), then, even if ) < 0 , the system can diverge
to another equilibrium. In order to still have cultural substitution, intolerance
should not change too greatly in a direction opposed to D (ri,p%). In particular, 
we always have cultural substitution when > 0 , that is when parents are 
more intolerant the more they represent a minority. It is not evident that it 
is the case. One can easily figure out cases where minorities are willing to 
integrate and so are less intolerant.
The Bisin and Verdier result is complemented by a condition on the elas­
ticity of intolerance. This additional term somehow follows the same logic. 
Bisin and Verdier established that the vertical transmission probability for in­
dividuals of type i must decrease with the group size of type i to have stable 
equilibria. The new elasticity term implies that intolerance must also decrease 
with the size of the group (in the case rjA. > 0 ), or more precisely that it may 
increase but not too much (case 0  > 77A. > — 1 ).
If the sufficient (but not necessary) conditions of Proposition 2 .1  are not 
satisfied then (2.3) may have multiple equilibria. They occur because reference 
groups depend on proportions. If groups were fixed over time (for instance 
Si =  7 Gq +  (1  — 7 ) 0 2  with 7  a positive constant smaller than 1) multiple 
equilibria would not arise.
Exam ple This example illustrates how population dependent reference groups 
generate multiple equilibria. It uses the transmission technology D (ri,p%) =  t* 
that satisfies dD^ f   ^ < 0 , and cost function C{ri) = that satisfies the 
convexity and monotonicity assumptions. It also assumes imperfect empathy 
y %j =  Ul(dj, a.i). Without social interactions the dynamic equation would 
have a unique stable equilibrium and it would be interior. Allowing for inter­
actions, it generates multiple equilibria.
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The two utility functions are
U \a u S u l3) =  - ^  +  < - ^ ( a 1 - 5 1) 2 
U2(a2, S2,S) = — 2  ~  2 ^ 12 ~~
Both types have a concern for conformity with respect to their reference
a2group and have the same cost — -f. However, only type 1 individuals benefit 
from contributing a i . Their payoff is a\ with 0 < p <  1.
While deriving endogenously the reference groups is beyond the scope of 
this example, I briefly try  to provide some intuition for these. A small minority 
is expected to be closed to influences outside its own group. For p small, the 
reference group of type 1 individuals is only composed of individuals of their 
own type. As p  increases, the community of type 1 becomes more integrated 
and starts mixing with type 2  individuals who enter in their reference group. 
However after some threshold, their influence decreases, possibly from two 
effects: first, type 1 are now a large majority of the population and they 
become more intolerant towards marginal agents; second, type 2  people, now 
a small minority, are less open to influences, as type 1 was when it was a 
minority. Figure 2 .2  illustrates the weights for a\ and a2 in S \.s
The upper curve is the weight 7 n , the lower curve is 7 12. For p = 0.6 the 
two weights are equal: type 1 consider equally all individuals when their own 
group represents a small majority of the population .4 The weights in S2 are 
defined symmetrically, such that they are equal for p =  0.4.
D (ri,p l) =  t* implies that stationary states are such that t \ =  r 2. Maxi­
mization of (2.5) yields that optimal efforts are such that =  p 7 A*. Equilibria
3The exact functions are available upon request. All the functions of the problem are 
continuously differentiable such that multiple equilibria cannot be attributed to discontinu­
ities.
4In other words, a type is "perfectly" tolerant, i.e. the two weights are equal, when he is
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Figure 2 .2 : Weights
are therefore solutions of p — Al^ *A2.
Figure 2.3 shows the two curves p and Al^ A2. For the chosen parameters5, 
there are three interior equilibria p\ < p% < p\- p\ and p*z are stable with 
respective basin of attraction (0 , ^ )  and (p2}l)- p2 is unstable. p\ represents a 
rather homogeneous society, with two large groups whose behaviors are quite 
similar. The type 2 community who does not value the action a2 in itself 
is however willing to take it by conformity. p% corresponds to an economy 
with a minority whose behavior is markedly different (a2 is almost zero). This 
example illustrates how initial conditions matter and how an exogenous shock 
can induce a switch between two different equilibria. For instance, a sudden 
immigration of type 1 individuals potentially changes the long run equilibrium 
from a homogeneous to a split society.
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2.2.2 Crowding out
I show in this section that a change in the parameter a  has a crowding out effect 
on any stable equilibrium p*. The main aim is to showr that intergenerational 
change is triggered by incentives that have an unexpected negative effect in 
the long run. The parameter a should be understood as a constraint that 
agents must take into account when maximizing their utility function. D is 
constrained to be only a function of t* such that equilibrium p* is determined 
by
-■ - ( s r s )  «
Assume that a  is a scalar and that it has a positive impact on 0 2 , ^  > 
0.6 A policy increasing a is beneficial for the action, at least in the short 
run. In particular, if a\ depends (weakly) positively on a, then the overall
6 Remember that a\ and a 2 are the short run equilibrium actions of respectively any type
1 and any type 2 individual. 0^ -  must be understood as the partial change in the short run 
of ao(A2, a), holding A2 constant. The total change in ^7 Ip in the short run is proportional 
to and of the sign of This is a consequence of moderate social influence.
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effect is unambiguous. But the change in ai and <22 implies that the long ran 
equilibrium is modified, since it alters the education efforts.
The derivative of (2.6) with respect to a  tells us how p* changes in the long 
run. I focus here on a simple case to illustrate the different effects at play, but 
the general case is given in the appendix. Assume =  0 and — 0: type 
1 utility is independent of a , and more importantly, Si is independent of a2. 
This implies that ai is independent of a. Type 1 individuals do not take into 
account the behavior of type 2 agents when deciding on their own action. This 
restriction is helpful in understanding the different effects because it holds a\ 
constant such that we can concentrate only on a2. Finally, parents exhibit 
imperfect empathy when choosing education. The result does not hinge on 
any of these assumptions.
From (2.6), it follows that
* £  -  (2-7)
V  [ ! ? ( « , * , . )  -  0 | ( . „ S „ „ ) ]
+p* [Ul(a i,S 2,a )  -  C/32 (a2 ,5 2 ,a)]
where K  > 0, Ul is the derivative of Ux with respect to its k-th variable 
and M2 =  f§2 §~ < 1 by MSI and because S2 is a convex combination of a\ 
and a2.
Crowding out results from the first two terms on the right hand side of 
(2.7). Given that Uh < 0 and the first order condition U}(ai, S i,a )  = 0, 
—U}(a2, Si, a) has the sign of a2 — ai.
On the other hand, U$(ai, S2,a ) — U$(a2, S 2, a) has the sign of ai — a2 
because of strategic complementarity. Therefore the first two terms (call them 
respectively Ei and E2) have opposite signs.
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Assume that a2 < a\, then E\ is negative, while E2 is positive. The total 
effect can be of any sign. The interpretation is the following: E\ is the change 
in type 1 parents education effort due to the change in a2, holding everything 
else constant. Since S\ is not affected by the change in a2, ai is constant. It 
implies that a2 is closer to a± than before and Ai falls. Type 1 parents decrease 
their effort because if they fail to transmit their trait, their children will still 
have a behavior quite close to theirs. As a consequence, it has become less 
important to educate children. This is what I refer to as a "neglect effect". 
Parents neglect to transmit their cultural trait because behaviors are quite 
homogeneous in the population, but they fail to understand that this relies on 
the current distribution of traits in the population.
Secondly, E2 is minus the change in A2 due only to the change in S 2. To 
understand its sign, imagine that both a\ and a2 are fixed and that S2 increases. 
Since a2 < S2 < a\ then it must be that S2 gets closer to a\. Given strategic 
complementarity, the marginal impact on U2 is larger for ai than for a2. Given 
the higher reference point, type 2  parents decrease their effort because type 1 
action is (marginally) closer to the reference. This has a positive impact on 
P*.
The change in a2 has similar consequences on type 1 and 2 education efforts, 
and so opposite consequences on p*.
Finally, there is a third effect, E$, that is the change in A2 due to the change 
in a. Without any further specification, this last term has not a well defined 
sign and may reinforce any of the first two effects. It is not, strictly speaking, 
related to the change in a2 as it would not be present had we Considered 
The strict consequence of increasing a2 is embedded in E\ and E2. However, 
a policy changing a  affects education directly through E3J
7It is not true without imperfect empathy when V 1^  is independent of a,  whereas E\  and 
E2 are always present.
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As a conclusion, when a2 increases, first it has a negative "private” effect on 
education decision: type 1 decrease their effort because type 2  individuals are 
less different from them than they used to be. Second, it has a positive "social" 
effect through social interactions, because the reference point is increased for 
type 2 , such that type 2  parents feel type 1 individuals are now closer to this 
reference point.
Proposition 2 .2  summarizes these results.8
P rop osition  2.2 I f  interactions exhibit strategic complementarity, an increase* 
in action aj, with aj < ai, has both a positive ”social" and a negative 1private n 
effect on p*.
Prom equation (2.7) there is always crowding out when there is no social 
effect. If there are no social interactions, then p* decreases without any am­
biguity. Incentives of a purely private activity that parents want to transmit 
are always crowded out. It seems however difficult to think of an activity com­
pletely independent of interactions and culturally transmitted. This particular 
case makes the result trivial. I focus in this article on situations with social 
interactions precisely because they make the problem more interesting, as well 
as more realistic.
We will say that there is no crowding out when p* increases with a. This 
occurs (abstracting from E3) if the social effect is larger than the private effect. 
Behaviors such that a change in the peer group action affects considerably 
(other things being equal) the marginal utility of one’s own action are less 
prone to crowding out. When private and peer group behaviors are close 
to being perfect complements, then the social effect E 2 is large. Strategic 
complementarity is crucial in avoiding crowding out. Highly social behaviors, 
like playing a team sport, enter into this category.
8 As shown in the appendix, they hold under general assumptions.
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W ithout strategic complementarity (i.e. Ui2 < 0) there is always crowding 
out. A classical example is the contribution to a public good where utility 
depends on the quantity of public good G =  Yli 9i and on the cost of one’s own 
contribution <7*. There are n individuals in the population. The reference group 
of individual i is formed by everyone but himself and Si = ^-j- Two
types of individuals i £ {1 , 2 } with utility functions U1 and U2 cohabit. U% — 
ul(gi-\-(n—l)S i)—ct(gi), with ul concave and cl convex. U\2 =  (n—1) (G)
is negative and so incentives must be crowded out. The interpretation of E\ 
is not affected but E2 means that when public good provision becomes larger 
free riding is seen as making more sense (substitution between gi and Si).
Throughout this discussion, the point emphasized is that private and social 
behaviors are complementary. Crowding out occurs because there is substitu­
tion in the transmission process between vertical and oblique channels. More 
powerful incentives impose a negative externality on cultural transmission. 
Strategic complementarity acts as an opposing force against this mechanism 
by creating a positive externality.
When ^  < 0, there is crowding out on different grounds.
First, an intervention increasing a2 in the short run has a negative effect 
in the long run (as long as ^  > 0 ) :
da2 _  1 da2 1 da2 dS2 dp*
da 1 — M2 da  1 — M2 dS2 dp da
' ----------------V----------------'  v------------------------------V-------------------------------'
short run long run
If the policy aimed at increasing a2, then it is crowded out. Note that, 
as is typical with social interactions, the social multiplier 1 — M2 amplifies 
the changes. Social interactions also imply that the change in p* affects a2. If
=  0 then there is no long run effect. Social interactions have a dual role 
in crowding out. First they mitigate the fall in p*, as shown above. Second
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they exacerbate how the fall in p* affects a2. They may imply that a2 actually 
decreases because of the modification in the peer group structure. It never 
happens without interactions because ^  would be equal to ^  > 0. This 
property of social interactions drives the intergenerational change because it 
says that a2 decreases over time.
Second, when a2 < cq, incentives tend to homogenize behaviors towards 
type 1 preferences. However, by promoting their behavior, it actually decreases 
their proportion in the population. It can be self defeating for a group of people 
to make individuals outside their group behave in a similar way.
Third, if one takes the average action a in the society as a measure of how 
much it is followed, then again, the intervention is crowded out.
da /. da2 , s dp* ^_  = (1_ p. ) _  + (a i_ a2)JL  (2.9)
Even if 7^  > 0, the average behavior can fall as the proportion of types 
shifts in favor of type 2  individuals. Once again social interactions have op­
posing effects on a.
The next section illustrates these different effects in a model of public good 
provision but first it is shown that the example above may exhibit crowding 
out in p* when 5 is increased. Figure 2.4 displays the different equilibria of 
the model when a  varies on a certain interval.9 It is not possible to find the 
closed forms of p* and so numerical computation is used.
The upper line of Figure 2.4 corresponds to pj, the upward sloping part of 
the parabola to the downward sloping part to p\. Proposition 2.2 does not 
apply to unstable equilibria and so we should look only at the evolution of p\ 
and pj. They both decrease with 5 because a larger 5 tends to homogenize
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Figure 2.4: p* as a function of 5
behaviors towards type 1 action. This model does not allow tractable forms 
and so we cannot make sharp predictions on the influence of parameters. The 
next section remediates to this issue.
2.3 A verage behav io r an d  th e  shape  of in te r­
actions
In this section I use the framework developed in Section 2 to build up a simple 
model that illustrates how interactions in the form of the function 7 affect the 
crowding out results. I assume that utility functions are quadratic. It turns 
out that in this special case we can always solve explicitly for the equilibrium 
and study how the shape of interactions influence the equilibrium actions. I 
investigate in particular the crowding out of the average action a when the 
desire to conform to the reference group increases. This happens for instance 
if behaviors become publicly observable, or there is praise for the reference
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action, or social stigma associated with "deviant" behaviors is stronger, etc. 
These institutional arrangements are common to ensure cooperation in a public 
good game. Two main results emerge from this analysis. First, when the 
reference action is the average action in the population, then a does not depend 
on conformity. When the reference group is perfectly representative of the 
population then crowding out cancels exactly any short run positive effect. 
Second, if the reference action is not the average action, then how interactions 
are affected by changes in type proportions determines whether a increases or 
not with conformity.
In order to fix ideas, I consider that agents have to choose a contribution 
to a public good but this is merely for expositional purpose. The average 
contribution a is proportional to the provision of public good in the society. 
Type 1 individuals are strong cooperators and, as in the last section, always 
choose the same contribution oi. Their utility function Ul does not need to 
be specified, but I assmne that it is concave and quadratic in ai, U\x = - / ? <  
0 with (3 being a constant. Type 2 individuals are conditional cooperators 
and are influenced by a reference contribution. Their utility U2(d2 , S 2 , ce) is 
assumed to consist of two components
U2(a2, S2j a) =  u(a2) -  a(a2 -  S2)2 (2.10)
u(a2) is the private utility associated with a contribution and is such that 
u {0 2 ) = — 00 < 0 with uj a constant. The interactions term in the form of 
—a(d2 — S 2 ) 2 captures a pure conformity effect. This functional form with 
conformity and quadratic private utility function is common in the social in­
teractions literature (Brock and Durlauf 2001, Glaeser and Scheinkman 2003). 
The private utility is less restrictive than it may seem. It encompasses cases 
where conditional cooperators do not enjoy any benefits from the public good
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but incur a linear cost u(a2) =  —<22? and cases where they do enjoy linear ben­
efits and incur a linear or quadratic cost of contributing: u(a2) =  —CL2 +  G and 
2
u(a2) =  ~ y  + G , where the public good G is the sum of all the contributions. 
Finally, I assume that ai > 0,2 is always satisfied. 10 The parameter a  measures 
the strength of conformity. A higher a  means that for a given proportion of 
strong cooperators the difference between conditional and strong cooperators 
contributions is smaller. The weight 7 (p) is not specified in order to under­
stand how it influences the equilibrium properties, and in particular public 
good provision.
It is shown in Appendix A that quadratic utility functions ensure that 
there is only one interior equilibrium p*, and that it is stable. It is such that, 
omitting the variables U1 and U2 depend on,
p* = ___^ 1 1___= _____H____ (2 11)
^11 +  ^11 /3 +  w +  a
It is immediate that the equilibrium proportion of strong cooperators falls 
with conformity a. There is always crowding out in proportions. Using the ter­
minology developed in the preceding section, it can be shown that the private 
effect is always larger than the social effect. Conformity implies that the com­
plementarity between private and reference contribution is not large enough 
to compensate for the fall in strong cooperators education effort. However a 
smaller p* does not imply that public good provision is smaller and higher con­
formity may actually be beneficial to the level of public good in the population. 
As long as conformity increases contributions there is a tradeoff between hav­
ing a large number of strong cooperators but conditional cooperators giving 
small amounts, and a smaller strong cooperators population but conditional
10The derivative of u can be written u'{a-2) =  oja,2+v. The condition a\ >  a<2 is equivalent 
to a 1 > —. It is always satisfied when v  <  0 , even if oj =  0 .
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cooperators contributing more.
Calculation of the derivative of a gives necessary and sufficient conditions 
on 7  (p) for public good provision to increase with conformity. All the functions 
7 (p) such that ^  =  0  can be found, and they will be useful to understand how 
the shape of 7  determines the variations of public good level.
P rop osition  2.3 Public good provision is not affected by conformity if and 
only if  for every p such that 0  < p < ^  7 (p) =  7 c (p) =  where C
is a constant.
The only function 7  that satisfies 0 <  7  (p) < 1 and — 0 is 7 (2?) =  
7 u+aip) =  P-
Proposition 2.3 makes two statements. First all the 7 C functions let provi­
sion be unaffected by conformity. They are defined only on the interval [0, 
because the equilibrimn proportion p* is necessarily in this interval, such that 
the value of 7  (p) for p > does not m atter in equilibrium. The tradeoff 
between higher contributions and smaller strong cooperators population size is 
perfectly balanced with these functions. If the constant C is greater than cu+/? 
then they are positive on the whole interval. However, for every C > u+ fi they 
are greater than 1 when p is large enough and so are not possible candidates 
for the weight 7 . So the only admissible 7 C function is obtained for C = lj-\-(3 
and in this case the reference group is simply the average contribution in the 
population, S 2 = a. If agents give the same weight to all the individuals in the 
population then conformity has no effect on public good provision.
A more general question is: for a given function 7 (p), is it possible to know 
whether it guarantees that public good provision increases with conformity? 
It actually is and the criterion is graphically easy to observe. First, notice 
that there is a one to one mapping between conformity level a  and equilibrium 






Figure 2.5: 7  and 7 C curves
because p* describes this interval when a goes from 0 to infinity. By looking 
at 7 (p) we are able to derive properties that work for all the possible values of 
a.
To get the answer, one has to draw the curve of 7  as a function of p, and 
then all the j c  curves11. At each point p the 7  curve crosses one (and only 
one) 7 C curve. If at this point the slope of 7  is higher than the slope of 7 ^ 
then for the conformity level a that results in p being the equilibrium, the 
quantity of public good is decreasing with conformity. It means that if we 
start in the equilibrium p, that corresponds to a conformity level a, and we 
increase conformity then in the long run we reach an equilibrium with less 
public good.
Figure 2.5 shows how the variations of public good provision can be ob­
tained by drawing the 7  function. The bold curve is an arbitrary 7 (p). The 
other curves are some of 7 ^ curves, including the 45 degree line. The vertical 
dotted line is at the proportion that is the highest possible equilibrium
11 These are actually "iso-public good" curves along which provision is constant.
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proportion. The function 7  has to be defined on the whole interval [0,1] but 
its values for proportions greater than do not affect the equilibrium. The 
dashed curve delimits the region where the 7 C curves are downward sloping. 
At each point of the set (0 , x [0,1] the curve of 7  crosses only one 
curve. Graphically it is immediate to check when the 7  curve is steeper than 
the 7 c  curve it crosses. Another way of looking at Figure 2.5 is that provision 
is larger on higher j c  curves. If an equilibrium lies on a higher 7 C curve than 
another one then public good provision is higher in that equilibrium.
The graph of all the 7 C curves shows that any increasing function 7  exhibits 
decreasing public good provision as long as it is in the lower right region of 
downward sloping 7 C curves. It means that for 7  small enough conformity 
always reduces public good provision in the society. In other words, agents 
must give some sufficient weight to strong cooperators in their reference group.
A general criterion for an increasing 7  function to yield increasing public 
good provision is that its variations should be moderate, such that its slope 
is not very steep. From Figure 2.5, it appears as well that concave functions 
easily ensure that public good provision is reinforced by conformity, while it 
is more difficult for convex 7  functions.12 The intuition behind this result 
appears when we decompose the different steps of an increase in conformity. 
Consider that we start in a long run equilibrium and that conformity increases. 
This is beneficial in the short run and contributions increase. However in the 
long run the proportion of strong cooperators in the population shrinks. This 
in turn affects the reference groups such that the weight of strong cooperators 
falls in the reference contribution. 13 This change of balance between types 
tends to decrease contributions, because agents wants to conform to a smaller 
reference. This effect is particularly large when the weight 7  varies a lot with
12Though it is not impossible. Consider for instance 7 (p) =  7g(p) as long as 7c (p) <  1 
and 1 otherwise, where 7^ is one of the convex 7C functions.
13 This assumes an increasing 7 function.
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proportion. In that case there is large shift in the composition of the reference 
group and it affects contributions dramatically.
7 (p) somehow measures sorting in the society: if there is perfect segrega­
tion then type 2  people do not have any contact with type 1 people and it 
would make sense to assume 7  =  0. If there is no segregation at all, such 
that reference groups are perfectly representative of the society, then 7  (p) = p 
and the quantity of public good provided is neutral to conformity. In many 
situations it seems natural to assume a less than perfect mixing of the popula­
tion. Figure 2.5 provides an example where the largest group in the population 
is over-represented in the reference group. For this kind of 7  function, a de­
creases unless the equilibrium proportion is high, that is conformity is low. For 
small values of a  it is possible to increase public good provision by promoting 
conformity. However above some threshold it is counterproductive.
The particular example of quadratic utility functions allows also to under­
stand how a change in interactions, that is a change in the 7  function, affects 
the quantity of public good. Starting from an equilibrium and changing the 
function 7  does not modify the equilibrium proportion in the long run but it 
changes a in equilibrium. If the new 7  curve crosses a higher 7 C curve at the 
this equilibrium proportion then provision has risen. The 7  function depicted 
on Figure 2.5 is of the type 7 (p) =  —/ i-P\* with n a positive number. The
p )
large is n the closer is 7  to a step function equal to 0  on [0 , | )  and to 1 on 
(5 ,1]. In other words the larger is n  the closer is the reference contribution to 
the contribution of the majority group. For a given conformity level, a larger 
n implies that less public good provision if in the equilibrium proportion is 
smaller than half, and more public good if it is greater than half. Figure 2.6 
shows that a higher n implies a higher curve, and so higher provision, only for 
proportions above one half.









' --------------  n=2
---------------  n=5
---------------  n=50
Figure 2.6: 7  curves
conformity level that maximizes public good provision is always smaller or 
equal than the level that maximizes conditional cooperators contributions. In 
this sense a certain degree of heterogeneity, whereby the society is made of two 
groups rather distinct in their choices may actually be optimal when compared 
with a more homogeneous society.
The setup of this section can be used for various issues where interactions
are determined endogenously. It is not the point of this chapter to build a
model that would provide a structural form to the weights in the reference 
contribution. It underlines how interactions structure the equilibrium and 
offers a framework to understand how they interact with cultural transmission. 
It is then useful to think in terms of a particular issue where interactions are 
determined by sorting into neighborhoods, membership to organizations, etc. 
This is left to future research.
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2.4 R elated  evidence
As mentioned in the introduction Putnam (2000) provides a wealth of evidence 
on intergenerational decline. He establishes that for many indicators individ­
uals have not changed through their lives, and that the observed decline is 
mostly due to generational change. It is particularly striking for voting. The 
continuous decline in turnout rates has been investigated, among many social 
scientists, by Putnam, and is not restricted to the US (see Rattinger 1992 for 
Germany, Phelps 2004 for the United Kingdom, Blais et al. 2004 for Canada 
argue that it reflects a large cultural change). The continuous fall in voting is 
a concern for the political system (Highton 2001) and it has been argued that 
voting should be made compulsory in the US (Lijphart 1997). Voting theories 
have tried to explain the secular fall in American turnout rates but the voting 
paradox has severely complicated the task. The paradox emerges when one 
realizes that the probability for a voter to be pivotal decreases quickly with 
the number of voters. If there is some cost of voting, even low, then the ex­
pected benefits must be extremely large to exceed the cost. As a consequence 
no rational voter would vote. Riker and Ordershook (1968) resolved the para­
dox by introducing a taste for voting. They find that a high sense of citizen 
duty has a much larger impact on voting than high values of the probability 
of the election being close and high values of the benefits. Other studies find 
that the sense of duty appears to be the best predictor of voting (see Mueller 
1989 for a review). This provides the rationale for introducing different types 
of individuals that differ in their preferences for voting. This taste is usually 
invoked to explain the fall in turnout rates (Aldrich 1993), but why it changed 
is not clear. 14 Sociologists have studied the generational nature of the problem 
but recognize that they fail to identify its causes (Miller 1992).
14 However, see Castanheira (2003) for an explanation using the rational voter model 
without introducing any taste for voting.
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Voting, even though done privately, is influenced by social pressure. I have 
already alluded to the guilt feeling reported by Putnam (2000) that young 
people feel less guilty than old people do when they do not vote. Quite in­
terestingly Harbaugh (1996) shows that a quarter of non voters in American 
presidential elections lie and claim they did vote when asked. Models of vot­
ing cannot account for lying and Harbaugh develops a model where people get 
praise for voting. Non-partisan campaigns that emphasize citizen duty and 
responsibility for the community offer evidence that this effect is at play.
My model provides an explanation of how the fall in turnout may be due to 
generational change. However the model requires something to be crowded out. 
Aldrich (1993) argues that costs are an unlikely candidate to explain voting 
patterns because they have fallen over time. Cultural transmission modelling 
provides a very different answer. Voting costs have been reduced because of 
liberalized registration laws, elimination of poll taxes and more recently post 
and online voting. In 1993 the National Voter Registration Act, known as 
Motor Voter, was signed into effect by President Clinton. This act makes the 
voter registration process easier by reducing "the necessary and burdensome 
bureaucratic obstacles" (as quoted on the official website for the National Voter 
Registration Act of 1993). Registration must be made available at agencies 
that provide public assistance. At the department of motor vehicles it must 
be incorporated into the process of applying for or renewing one’s driving 
license. Internet voting systems have already been used in the US, the UK, 
Ireland, Switzerland, and Estonia. In the rational voter framework this points 
unambiguously towards an increase in turnout rates. I argue that this is a short 
run result and that in the long run the opposite may be true. To facilitate 
voting actually makes it so easy that generations tend in a way to forget why 
people used to vote. From a policy perspective this is a rather frustrating 
result and calls for education campaigns.
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Much of the literature on church attendance in the US suggests that there 
are no cohort effects. Furthermore attendance rates have been stable for the 
last thirty years. However Miller and Nakamura (1996) argue that it should 
not be the case because the baby boomers are aging, and religiosity of this 
cohort is usually found to increase with age. They logically conclude and 
then check that old generations are replaced by young generations who attend 
church less regularly. Such patterns have also been studied in Britain by Voas 
and Crockett (2005). They find a strong cohort effect in church attendance 
and religious affiliation.
Another body of research (Peele 1984, Sorman 1985) argues that the decline 
in traditional values has produced a religious backlash. This fits well the 
predictions of the model, whereby a shock to morals in the sixties would lead to 
a revival later on. A growing gap between liberals and conservatives reinforces 
conservatism.
Similarly, each individual cohort is as trusting as it ever was but the overall 
level of trust has fallen because the old generation is replaced by a much less 
trusting one. Robinson and Jackson (2001) indicate that the over-time decline 
in trust is partly explained by aging but that it is mainly a cohort effect initi­
ated in the 40s. Putnam concludes is that half the decline observed in social 
capital and civic engagement can be traced back to generational change. The 
Second World War, and the strong focus on national unity and patriotism that 
accompanied it, may provide the exogenous change required in the model to 
have crowding out. After the war, people felt they had to be more civically 
engaged, or that voting was indeed a civic duty that one could not miss. In 
more egalitarian societies, where behaviors are less class specific, homogeniza­
tion may have led to crowding out. The theory says that this upsurge backfired 
because these preferences were not transmitted strongly enough.
57
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter argues that cultural transmission can explain the decline of a 
broad range of values. Parents neglect to transmit preferences when behav­
iors are homogeneous. This result relies on two mechanisms: first, the substi­
tutability between vertical and oblique transmission, second social interactions. 
In particular I emphasize how a policy has unexpected consequences in the long 
run that crowds it out.
This chapter also shows that the Bisin and Verdier (2000) cultural trans­
mission process can be extended to situations where agents interact. As culture 
is usually characterized by peer effects and interactions, this is an interesting 
point. A subject for future research is to extend this framework to let agents 
choose their peer group. In many cases, people sort into neighborhoods where 
education is then made. Parents would have to make a residential choice. 
Although this is partially included in the model, since parents choose an ed­
ucation effort that can reflect a neighborhood choice, it would be fruitful to 
see how a precise formulation would affect reference groups and would make 
predictions on the geographic distribution of preferences.
Finally, the framework developed in this chapter serves to understand how 
institutional arrangements modify behaviors by affecting the distribution of 
preferences. Crowding out casts a shadow on the benefit of having good insti­
tutions. Strong beneficial constraints are defeated by socialization, such that 
it may be optimal to opt for weak constraints, maybe with smaller short run 
benefits, to preserve a ’’good" cultural trait. As argued in the introduction, 
this result leads to a dynamic theory of institutional change. If institutions de­
signed to promote a behavior reach the opposite outcome then at some point 
in time they should be replaced by others. It requires to make institutions 
endogenous, and this is the purpose of the next chapter.
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2.6 A ppendix 1
2.6 .1  Tw o "im possib ility  results"
The next two propositions prove two impossibility results for quadratic utility 
functions.
A simple sufficient condition for cultural substitutability is that >  0 for 
both types. Proposition 2.4 shows that under fairly general conditions, this is 
never satisfied for both i and j .  V£ is the derivative of V 1 with respect to its 
A;-th variable.
P roposition  2.4 I f  sign(V{ (aj, Si, a)) =  — sign(V{ (a ,^ Sj, a)) and Vfl2 =  
v in  =  V?12 = Vm = o then =  - « 9n ( ^ ) .
The first condition is always satisfied when imperfect empathy is assumed, 
i.e. when V tj — Ul (aj, Si, a), as in Bisin and Verdier (2001) and most of the 
literature using this model. More generally, it holds whenever type i considers 
aj to be too small in the sense that a higher aj, holding everything else constant, 
would increase its valuation of being a type j ,  and on the contrary type j  
considers to be too large.
The second condition is satisfied for all the utility functions quadratic in 
a{ (VIn =  0 ) and for most of the social interactions specifications used in the 
literature. A very common example is — (aj — Si)2, another is (both are 
given in Brock and Durlauf 2001). Both satisfy V112 =  0.
The most widely used utility functions yield that by allowing agents to 
interact, we cannot expect to rely on the simple conditions that ~  > 0  for 
both types to have a unique stable equilibrium.
P roof o f P roposition  2.4
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Define the matrices ^  =dp
_dAi dSi dAi
dp dS dp dA _ dp
dA2 ’ dp dS2 ’ dp dA2
dp dp dp
da 1 dAj _dA1 5Ai
ilarly ^  7 dp . 5 = da 1 da2 and (j) = dSi
da2 dA2 dA2 0dp da\ da2





-E -  Mimi 11 -M i12
— M 2 I  -----A^ 22m2
’ m
- 0  mi
0  J -m2
and M  =
M n Mj 2 
M21 M22
where
=  f§? and My =  daj.asi
Actions a ,^ reference groups 5* and intolerance Aj are such that aj =  
Oj(5j,a), 5* =  5 j(a i,a 2 ,a ) , and Aj =  A j(a i,a 2 ,S i,a ). Differentiation shows 
that D g  =  g ,  hence g  =  i ) - 1^  and g  =  g  +  M g  =  (I  + M D ~l ) g .  
And therefore g  =  <Sg + 0 g  =  <5£>_1g  +  <j> (I + M D " 1) g .
Using J +  M ZT 1 =  d - z r 1,
dA / r
T p - \ s  +  ^ ) d  %> (2.12)
When Ux\ 2 =  =  V/ 12 =  Vyn =  0, using Taylor expansions of V 1 and
- V 11(a2,S 1,a) V t f a S u a )
- V 2(a i ,S 2,a) V?(a i ,S 2,a)




V 2(a i ,S 2,a)
(2.13)
where ui is a scalar. If sign)!7,’ (ar/ S',,«)) =  —sign)!7/  (at, S}, a ) ) , then 
(2.13) shows that s i g n ( ^ )  =  - s i g n ( ^ ) .  QED.
Next, we focus on the case where D (rj,pz) =  D (rj). Bisin and Verdier 
(2001) underline that when D does not depend on p%, cultural substitutability 
is automatically satisfied. In the more general framework of this chapter, it is 
not true any more. It is interesting to study this case because by making D
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directly independent of p 1, it allows us to isolate the effect of p% on stability 
through the intolerance factors.
In this particular case and from the dynamic equation (2.3), the interior 
equilibrium is such that t* =  Tj, when parents exert the same education effort.
(2.3) defines p* implicitly p* =  Ai^ A2 .
Proposition 2.5 shows that imperfect empathy and quadratic utility func­
tions in a,i produce a unique stable equilibrium.
P roposition  2.5 With D {r^ p %) =  D {ri) , imperfect empathy and quadratic 
utility functions in ai, the dynamic system  defined by (2.3) has only one inte­
rior equilibrium, it is stable and such that p* =  nl ^  s2 a) •
To generate multiple equilibria with social interactions, we cannot use im­
perfect empathy and quadratic utility functions. We have to rely on more 
complex specifications. Proposition 2.5 makes Proposition 2.4 rather irrele­
vant when there is imperfect empathy as it says that we should not worry 
about any stability condition in this case. However, Proposition 2.4 still has 
some interest for more general V 1 functions.
Proposition 2.5 shows how, under particular assumptions, the equilibrium 
is related to the characteristics of the utility functions. If U1 becomes more 
concave than U2 then p* increases. Individuals with more concave utility 
functions are more sensitive to differences between a* (or, alternatively, they 
are more intolerant) and so choose higher efforts. In equilibrium they represent 
a larger proportion of the population (as p* > \  is equivalent to | Uh 
This proposition shows as well that parameters that do not enter into the 
second order derivatives have no influence on the equilibrium. By extension 
there is no crowding out for such parameters.
P roof o f P roposition  2.5
We know that p* =  A^ Aj- Imperfect empathy implies that =  0
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from the first order conditions of the maximization of Ul. Taylor expansions 
on Ai — Ul(ai) — U%(cij) yield
„♦ = _______U}1(a i,S1,a)_______
P C/11(aI,5 1,a) +  C/121(a2,5 2,a ) V ' ’
The assumption Uh < 0  proves that p* > 0. Quadraticity of the util­
ity functions implies that g- is a constant and so that the
equilibrium is stable. QED
2.7 A ppendix 2: proofs o f th e  propositions
P ro o f o f P roposition  2.1
The proof of Proposition 2 in Bisin and Verdier (2001) provides the main 
part of the proof. Only the very end is different. First, the indirect cost 
function H(di,pl) of direct socialization is defined:
H(di,pl) =  min s.t. d* =  D(ri,pl) (2-15)
Using the assumptions on C  and D , the minimization problem is convex. 
As a consequence H  is continuous in di and pl and the argmin t* is a continuous 
mapping from [0, l ]2 into Mn, r(di,pl). Therefore H  is convex in di and satisfies 
H{0,pl) — 0 Vp* G [0,1] and =  0 when di =  0.
Let Ai denote the Lagrange multiplier of the constraint in (2.15). The first 
order condition is
c '(Ti) = A i—  (2.16)
di =  D(rh pl) (2.17)
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Differentiation of (2.17) implies
1 = w t %  (2-18)
0  -  <2-19>
Hence from (2.18) Ti(di) is increasing in di. Differentiation of (2.16) yields 
with (2.19)
C T ( r d T~  =  (2 .2 0 )dpt dpt d n
(2.20) shows that sign But from (2.19) this has the
sign of - f g .
But, by the Envelope Theorem, =  A,, and hence 
. /  d2H  \  . ( d D \
Slgn ( W d d J = ~ s>gn W )  (2'21)
Individuals have to choose <L:
max V ij +  [d, +  (1  -  di)p ‘l A< -  H fa p * )  (2 .2 2 )
di€[0,l]
Differentiation of the first order condition of the maximization problem 
implies that
(2-23)
Hence |p  < 0 if >  0 and [(1 — p1) AJ <  0. This is satisfied if 
| p  < 0 and r]A. > —1. Finally, d ( l )  =  0 since [d +  (1 — d)p*]'A* in (2.22) is 
independent of d* a.t p% = 1.
P roof o f P roposition  2.2: C rowding Out
In this section we deal with the general case when there is a change in one 
component a c of the vector of parameters a.
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First, using (2.6), a necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium to 
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dp* A2 # 1 -  Ai
(A 1 +  A2) ^ -  =  ^ % — A
dac Ai +  A2
dAi
dotc dAi *dA2( 1 - p  ) —-----pda. da. (2.28)
Combining all the derivatives with respect to a c, we get the change in p* 
due to the change in the parameter a c.
(A i 4- A 2)
dp*
da.




(A i +  A 2) +
r - 1 /




i - p *
p *
(2.29)
(s + <t>M) z r 1— +  ^
m  oac
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Assume > 0 and a\ > a2. The non zero entries of <f> on row i is 
V2 (a2, S \  a) — VjfaijS*, a) for i =  1,2. These are negative by MSI. The term
1 - p
4>M increases p* (because it is multiplied by the negative term
P'
)•
erThis corresponds to the "social effect" whereby each group thinks it is bett 
to be a type 1 because their behavior is closer to the reference S'1.
The non diagonal entries of 5 are V11(a2, Si, a) on the first row and —Vi2 (ai, S2, a) 
on the second row. They are positive by assumption (in other words, type 1 
consider a2 to be too low, and type 2 consider a\ to be too high). This is always 
true when imperfect empathy is satisfied. These two terms decrease p*. These 
are the "private" effects, whereby a higher a2 decrease type 1 intolerance and 
a higher a\ increase type 2 intolerance. The non diagonal terms can reinforce 
or not these effects. With imperfect empathy they are equal to zero.
Therefore in (5 + (ftM), there are negative "private" effects and positive 
"social" effects. The "private" terms are at the origin of crowding out. Inter­
actions reduce the magnitude of crowding out.
Nothing can be said at this level of generality about
In Section 2 .2 , we assumed imperfect empathy, dul 
In this case when expanded (2.30) becomes
= 0 a n d g |  =  M12 =  0.
(A, +  A 2) +
r -1 /
1 ~ p * d A dp*
P* dp da,c







1 -  m 2M22 dac
[UUa2,S 2, a ) - U p ai,S 2,a)]
-p* [C/| (a2) S2, a) -  Ut K  S2, a)]
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and M2 =  m2M22 give (2.7).
P ro o f o f  P roposition  2.3
The condition =  0 yields a first order differential equation on 7 .
/3 ( l - p ) 2 + p 2u  
7  -  —Ti TrTj 7 r ^ T 7  +
pcu
p (1 -  p)[0 -  + p)\ (1 -  p)[/3 -  p(o> + P)\ =  0
(2.32)
The solutions to this equation are the 7 C functions and it is easy to check 
that the only 7 C function that satisfies 7 c (p) £ [0 , 1] for every p  £ (0 , ^ ^ )  is
7 „+^(p)= p-
The condition 4  ^ >  0 isda
7  < p (i - l pf - - p(M- +l  [ [/5(1 -  P) 2 +  A>] 7 -  H  (2.33)
The right hand side is equal to the slope of the 7 C curve and so i >0is 





I now use the main result of the last chapter about the existence of crowding 
out in intergenerational transmission. I relax the strong assumption that the 
variable generating crowding out is exogenous, and consider instead that it 
is determined by majority voting. Crowding out is now endogenously gener­
ated. This extension of the model is quite natural. Individuals with different 
preferences are expected to prefer different institutions and try to influence 
the political process to change the institutional arrangements. In the public 
good model of Chapter 2  conditional cooperators would vote for a lower level 
of public goods than strong cooperators. The important point is that differ­
ent institutions imply different dynamics, and so different steady states. The 
political process selects institutions that affect behaviors and population dy­
namics. Those subsequently change institutions through the political process. 
I underlined in the preceding chapter how institutions were self-defeating, in 
the sense that they crowded out the behaviors they were supposed to promote. 
The endogenization adds a second self-defeating effect: not only they crowd out 
behaviors, they also crowd themselves out by reducing their political support
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in the population. Greif (2006) argues that institutions can be self-reinforcing 
or undermining by modifying parameters that lead them to thrive or decline. 
Crowding out is an undermining process because it slowly erodes the political 
majority that votes for the institution.
Cultural transmission has already been used in models with voting. Bisin 
and Verdier (2000) study the provision of public goods through majority vot­
ing, and Bisin and Verdier (2004) look at the evolution of work ethics that 
determine the generosity of the welfare state. None of these models consider 
crowding out.1 They instead focus on the beliefs that support a given steady 
states and find that optimistic beliefs can lead a minority to become eventually 
the only existing group in steady state. This chapter adopts a similar approach 
but with crowding out. I show that there are dynamics where no steady state 
and, more importantly, no rational expectations path in pure strategies exists. 
Agents are bound to be wrong in their rational expectations. Decisions cannot 
be based on beliefs consistent with the future. Myopia would make choice pos­
sible but at the cost of rationality. I instead study why rational expectations 
fail to produce consistent dynamics. Agents do not take into account the ef­
fect of their choice on the evolution of preferences. One way to restore rational 
expectations is to let agents create some institution of collective decision that 
internalizes the effect of individual socialization efforts on preferences dynam­
ics. By doing so agents’ expectations are rational. That creates a rationale for 
the existence of collective socialization institutions that coordinate decisions. 
Bisin and Verdier (2000) also provide conditions for such institutions to exist 
and I am close to their perspective of institutions as strategic devices to select 
particular cultural paths. However in their model the motive for agents is only
1 Without going too much into technical details, these models only have two possible 
steady states, either at 0 or 1. Parameters change the dynamics to reach these, but do not 
modify their value. This peculiarity is usually due to the fact that parents with different 
cultural traits do not make efforts simultaneously.
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to shift political power in their favor. I find similarly that cultural groups use 
institutions to be majoritarian in the future, but I provide a second justifi­
cation setting them up. They solve the puzzle of the impossibility of having 
rational expectations. Agents do realize that their decisions cannot be consis­
tent with their expectations and find a mechanism in the form of institutions 
to organize their uncoordinated actions.2
3.2 Endogenous in stitu tions
There are two types of individuals, identified by i E {1,2}, with preferences 
represented by their utility functions Ui{ai). Agents maximize their utility 
with respect to a* subject to some constraint gi(a) where a  is a parameter, 
and this yields their optimal choice a*(a) . 3 I make the assumption that a* is 
an increasing function of a.
I assume that preferences are transmitted from parents to children but 
unlike Chapter 2 , parents vote over the value of a. It could be the level of 
taxation, school funding, unemployment benefits, etc. The outcome is deter­
mined by majority voting. I assume that type 1 parents prefer a high level of 
o, denoted ct\. On the other hand type 2  parents’ optimal choice is a2, with 
ol2 < ol\. p represents the proportion of type 1 parents in the population, and 
so when p < a = a 2, and a = a i otherwise.4 To fix ideas, one can say that 
when type 1 agents are a majority in the population they vote for a high level 
of taxes, and when not the voting outcome is a low level of taxes.
Chapter 2  established that under these assumptions, the steady state p*(a)
of the distribution of cultural traits in the population may be a decreasing func­
2 An alternative approach would look at the possibility of mixed strategy equilibrium. I 
study only pure strategies equilibria here.
3 Note that compared to chapter 2 and for simplicity, these preferences do not include 
social interactions. The framework can be extended to include them.
4In the limit case p = I assume that a i is implemented.
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tion of a,. It provided examples where it is satisfied for all the possible values 
of the parameters. I impose the following assumption: because of crowding 
out p*(ai) < |  <  p* (o2)- It can be expressed with the intolerance parameters 
A i(a) = Ui(a*(a))—Ui(a,j(a)). The condition is equivalent to A i(oi) < A2 (ai) 
and Ai(ct!2) > ^ 2 (0 :2 )- It means that type 1 parents are more intolerant than 
type 2  parents when taxes are low, and that type 1 parents are less intolerant 
than type 2  parents when taxes are high. In other words, individuals are less 
intolerant when their preferred policy is implemented.
The fraction pt+i of individuals of type 1 in period t +  1 is given by
P t + 1 ~ P t =  P t {  1 -  P t )  [ t i  -  t 2] (3.1)
Ti is the socialization effort of parents of type i. Because of the absence of 
social interactions, we know that for a given value of a  equation (3.1) has only 
one interior stationary state, and that it is stable.
3.3 T he socialization  problem
Type i parents choose t* to maximize their utility in period t
+  r ^ ip t+ i )  ~ y  (3-2)
where PtM and P are the transition probabilities at time t, V lj is the
utility of a type j  child as perceived by a type i parent. pf+1 is the expected
proportion of type i agents next period, associated with the corresponding
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political equilibrium. For j  G {1,2}
y i j
V 2j
« i(a j(a i)) if p?+i >  3 
ui(oJ(a2)) if Pt+i <  2
u2(a'{ai)) i f j ^ + 1 > 5  
M t f M )  if Pt+i < 2
(3.3)
(3.4)
Optimal socialization effort can be derived using the intolerance parameters
3.4 R ational expectations failure
Population dynamics depend on agents’ expectations. I now characterize the 
rational expectations path where pet+l =  P t + i -  The dashed curve on Figure 
3.1 gives the value of pt+1 — pt as a function of pt when expectations are that 
Pt+i < b  and so that a = a 2 . The other curve depicts the evolution of pt 
when pf+l > 1 , and so a = a\.
For some values of pt agents with rational expectations are bound to be 
wrong. Assume that pt =  \  +  e, with e > 0 and small. If agents think that 
P t +1  >  1, we can read on the non-dashed curve that pt+1 ~ P t <  0. For e small 
enough it implies that pt+1 < 1 - These expectations are ruled out, because 
they are not rational. So it must be that p^+1 < b  But in that case, using 
now the dashed curve, pt+1 — Pt > 0 , and so pt+1 > | . 5
5 This is true only for the case where the two equilibria are on either sides of | .  This does
( l - p t)A i ( a i) i f P i + i > 5  
( l - p , ) A i(«2)  i fPj+i  <  1
P ,A 2(q i)  if p ‘+i >  5 






Figure 3.1: Dynamics under different institutions
Whatever their expectations are, agents must be wrong. There is no ra­
tional expectations path, at least in some interval that includes | .  Agents are 
unable to make a rational choice. This surprising result is driven by the fact 
that individuals take isolated, uncoordinated decisions. Despite their rational 
expectations, they do not take into account the influence of their effort on 
next period population state. In technical terms, they do not use equation 
(3.1) when maximizing their utility.
Myopic agents with pf+1 =  pt would not suffer from this impossibility of
choosing. However it does not imply that the population converges to a steady
state. We would actually observe cycles around \  (but not necessarily centered
on |) .  Assume that initially p0 > As long as pt is above | ,  pt+i —pt < 0  and
at some point in time pt falls below | . It implies subsequently that pt+1 — pt > 0,
not have to be satisfied. Assume for instance that both are above Crowding out means 
that the institutions chosen by the majority lead to the lowest steady state. Institutions 
make the majoritarian group smaller than it could be.
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and pt increases until it is above and we enter a new phase of falling pt , and 
so on. There is no equilibrium, not even The policy implemented changes 
with the cycles of pt and there are alternate political majorities.
3.5 C ollective decision
The failure of individual rational expectations calls for a device that preserves 
the assumption of rationality. When agents coordinate, or leave the choice 
of effort to a collective institution (school for instance), they anticipate the 
consequence of their choice on pt+1 - Type 1 institution maximizes
P ? V U ( P et + 1 ) +  Pt12V 12(pet+1) -  J  (3.7)
=  (1 - P t ) V 12(pt+i) +  (1 -p*)A i(p t+i) -  Y  
s.t V 12(pt+i) = u i(a2 (ai)) if P t+ i> ^
V l2(pt+1) = ui(a2{a2)) ifpf+i < i
A ife+ i) =  Ai(oq) if Pt+i > i  
Ai (pt+i) =  A i(a2) i ip t+ i < ^
P t + i  ~ P t  =  P t {  1 -  P t )  [t i  -  t 2]
The solution to the maximization problem (3.7) is a function of r 2, where 
it is assumed that type 2 agents do not coordinate. 7 Type 1 parents are able 
to adjust their effort in order to force the proportion pt+1 to be above | .  They 
do so only if it makes them better off. The point is that their expectations will 
now be rational because they take into account the dynamics of cultural traits 
when making their choice. I provide an example to illustrate the argument.
6However dynamics can converge to a stable cycle where Pt+2 — Pt-
7If type 2 individuals follow a similar program, it creates a game between institutions 
whose reaction functions are given by their respective maximizations.
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E xam ple There are two types of agents in the population. They value 
consumption and two different types of goods that can be publicly or privately 
provided. Utility functions are
( uAc, hi) = c + 2y/h[U '  (3.8)
U2(c, h2) — C + 2y/hz
Type i agents’ preferences depend on consumption c and good hi. At 
the beginning of each period agents receive an income / .  Good hi can be 
publicly or privately provided. When it is done publicly all individuals have 
to contribute a fixed quantity, and the state provides it as a public good. 
Private provision is done at the individual level, it is more expensive (for 
instance because of economies of scale) and the good is consumed privately. 
An alternative interpretation is that good hi is either a public good at the state 
level, with compulsory contributions through taxes, or a club good.8 Because 
of economies of scale in its production it is more expensive when consumed as 
a club good. Individuals vote for which of hi or h2 is publicly provided. Since 
type i agents do not consume hj they always vote for hi to be provided by the 
state, to benefit from its lower price. The majority group imposes its choice 
to the minority, which can still provide its own club good, but at a larger cost. 
The price of a publicly provided good is assumed to be equal to 1, the price of 
a privately provided good is 6 > 1 .
This model captures situations where two groups have conflicting prefer­
ences over the nature of the public good. For instance one group may favor 
religious schools, while the other prefers secular schools. When the secular 
agents are majoritarian the state raises taxes to finance secular public schools.
8 The public good is non excludable. The conflict between the two types of agents is 
about which good should be available to everyone and publicly financed. Agents do not 
prefer to enjoy private goods because public finance implies a smaller cost.
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This does not prevent the religious minority to open religious schools, however 
it is more costly.
Assume that type i agents represent the largest group. They maximize 
their utility Ui(I — hi, hi), and vote for the quantity h* to be provided by the 
state through taxation. Type j  agents have to pay their taxes and so maximize 
their utility Uj ( I  — h* — 6hj, hj).
h* =  1
h* — 1
(3.9)
The intolerance functions are
Aj -  £
Pt+i > ° (3-10)
2 1  A2 =  ^ l
Pt+l <
n a — 29~ l  1 I
2 Ao —
The two possible states p\ and are
Pt+i > 2 =^ P'1 '~20  (3'n )
There is intergenerational crowding out and p\ < |  < p2 - A high level of hi 
results in a small population of agents with type i preferences. The political 
process implies that there is no steady state. Each majority implements a 
policy that decreases its size. As argued above there exists an interval K  that 
includes \  such that no rational expectations are possible. Any belief that 
pt+i is larger than |  leads to efforts that make it smaller than Agents 
cannot have correct expectations when they decide their efforts individually.
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A collective institution can be set up to choose the optimal effort by solving 
(3.7).
In this example, when pt f  K  rational expectations impose that pt+i > \  
if and only if pt >i So outside K  the rational expectations path is unique, 
and well defined when agents act individually. Assume now that pt G K  and 
Pt > \  and that type 1 agents decide collectively their socialization effort. 
If expectations are that p^+1 > 5. type 1 parents would optimally choose
— ^ r 1. However this is not consistent with their beliefs. Given r 2, their 
effort is too low. In order to fulfill pt+i > b  they must choose a higher effort. 
It can be shown that their optimal choice is such that p t+1 is exactly | .  The 
alternative is to decide collectively to switch to a regime with pt+i < i .  But 
this is never optimal: parents prefer their cultural trait to be majoritarian next 
period.
The point of this example is to show how collective socialization allows 
rational expectations to be maintained. A more complete analysis would study 
the range of group sizes that support the emergence of institutions that affect 
socialization. I keep on assuming that only type 1 individuals consider this 
opportunity. For every pt K  and pt > \  it is interesting to see that there are 
no benefits to such institutions. It would only replicate individual decisions 
that maximize utility with rational expectations. So institutions emerge only 
for relatively small group sizes. Second, a type 1 institution always tries to 
give the majority to type 1 individuals next period. It is never profitable to 
set up an institution that collectively decides to lose, or avoid winning, the 
majority. Third, there is a threshold p £ K,  and between 0 and | ,  such that 
for every pt larger than p agents of type 1 gain from deciding collectively their 
socialization efforts, and are able to be majoritarian next period. These new
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dynamics lead to a unique steady state with equal group sizes.9
Institutions affecting cultural change are therefore likely to be created for 
not too small minorities and for small majorities. Outside this group size 
range, either the group is too small to be majoritarian next period (it would 
require a too large effort), or it is large enough to be still a majority next 
period.
Finally, I assumed that only one group was able to create an institution, 
but one could also study the case where both groups can do so. There would be 
competition between the two groups, as each one would try to be majoritarian 
next period. I leave this possibility for future research.
3.6 C onclusion
Crowding out undermines the purpose of institutions but also their founda­
tions. Individuals can willingly create good institutions, and it makes good 
behavior widespread. However eventually it leads to the demise of the insti­
tution by eroding the political support required for its existence. This is a 
dismal story for anyone considering how institutions can induce good behav­
ior. This chapter shows that individuals can counterbalance this undermining 
trend by organizing themselves and promote their culture collectively, instead 
of relying on uncoordinated actions. Institutions can be accompanied by other 
institutions to avoid this effect. Public education is a collective device that 
complements private education in order to support rules that makes existing 
institutions viable.
9 The assumption that type 1 agents win the election when p t =   ^ is important for this 
point to be a steady state. It should be thought of as a limit: the collective decision should 




Cultural transm ission through  
network formation
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is a first attempt to bring some elements of network theory into 
the framework of the intergenerational transmission of preferences. A recent 
strand in the literature has been initiated by Bisin and Verdier (2001, denoted 
hereafter BV) who developed a new model of transmission of preferences from 
parents to children. The transmission mechanism can be decomposed into two 
components: vertical and oblique. Parents prefer their children to have the 
same preferences because they are imperfectly altruistic. They can socialize 
their children to their cultural trait, at the cost of some effort. This describes 
the vertical transmission and it takes place inside the family. The oblique 
transmission occurs only if the vertical failed. Children are influenced by 
individuals outside of their family and are socialized to their culture. In the 
BV model, and in most models based on it, oblique transmission takes the 
form of a random matching with subsequent successful cultural transmission. 
Children are merely passive in this process.
I relax this assumption and consider instead that children build a network 
of friends from families of different cultures. They are then influenced by the 
composition of their network. If a child has most of his friends from one par­
ticular cultural group then he is very likely to adopt the preferences of this 
group because he is often exposed to them. Parents can intervene by affect­
ing network formation. They can influence the cost of an intergroup link (as 
opposed to an intragroup link). This action can take different forms: parents 
can choose to live in a segregated neighborhood, put their child in a religious 
school, or use verbal recommendations ("I do not want you to play with these 
kids", "I do not want you to go to this area of the city", etc.). This action 
is costly: rent for the residential choice, fees for the school, time, or even re­
sentment from the child for the verbal recommendations. Parents choose their 
optimal effort anticipating network formation, and then children choose their 
friends given the costs and benefits of friendships. Vertical (parents’ effort) 
and oblique (socialization through the network) transmissions are intertwined 
and are the result of choices from both parents and children.
Network formation creates a game between parents from different cultural 
groups. Because a link between two agents can only be created when both 
consent, children from one cultural group are constrained in their network 
building: they cannot find enough individuals willing to accept their friendship. 
If parents from group A  make a high effort, their children create few intergroup 
links and children from group B  are constrained. Group B  parents can free 
ride on this effort and optimally choose a zero socialization effort. Socialization 
is a public good and parents who value it less free ride on the contributions of 
parents with a high valuation. I derive the Nash equilibria of this game with 
two cultural groups and show that for a range of group sizes there always exist 
two equilibria in effort, each with a different group choosing a zero effort. I 
investigate the case where majority voting is used as an equilibrium selection
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mechanism.
I consider the effect of intolerance on the political equilibrium. I show 
first that, depending on the parameters, the political equilibrium may be the 
outcome always preferred by the most intolerant group. This is never true 
for the least intolerant group, regardless of the parameters. There seems to 
be an advantage to intolerance in the political process. However I then show 
that parents’ welfare increases with the intolerance of parents from the other 
cultural group. The intuition follows from the public good nature of social­
ization: highly intolerant parents choose a high effort and prevent friendships 
with children from other groups. More tolerant parents benefit from this high 
effort at no cost, and free ride on the intolerant group.
I then study the dynamics of preference transmission to find the steady 
states in cultural group sizes. The political process "eliminates” some steady 
states. When parents have the choice between two equilibria the majority 
never chooses to implement one of them, thereby avoiding the steady state it 
does not prefer (at the disadvantage of the minority). This political selection 
may culminate in the absence of steady states and induce political cycles with 
alternating majorities and equilibrium in efforts.
Another important feature is the role of intolerance and of network char­
acteristics. First, the cultural group whose children have the smaller number 
of friends is the group having to exert some effort in the steady state. This 
"least connected type" does not free ride in steady state and so there is an 
advantage in having many connections, both inter and intra group. Second, 
intolerance is detrimental to the survival of a cultural group. There are two 
consequences to intolerance. It prevents intergroup friendships, and so social­
ization to other cultural traits. But it also prevents socialization of individuals 
external to the group. A very closed cultural group is safe from external influ­
ences, but it also fails to spread its culture to other cultural groups. It is not
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present in steady state, but only if it is weakly connected internally. A highly 
intolerant group does survive if its children have many friends from their own 
group. This second property underlines the importance of the structure of the 
intragroup network. It also sheds some light on the measures a shrinking cul­
tural group may take in order to survive cultural transmission: it should focus 
on the importance of internal links, and on its internal identity. The model 
shows how intolerance preserves a cultural group from external influences and 
so contributes to its pereniality, but at the same time prevents its expansion.
Few articles in the economics literature relate to this work, apart from those 
on cultural transmission initiated by BV and surveyed in Bisin and Verdier 
(forthcoming). One exception is Pattachini and Zenou (2006) who consider a 
somewhat similar process of network formation because children choose their 
percentage of same-race friends. However the authors assume that choices of 
friends from children of the two groups are always compatible, and do not 
integrate their model in the cultural transmission framework. Although I am 
not providing an explicit model of network formation (see Jackson 2006 for a 
review), I am going a step further in recognizing that these choices are usually 
not compatible and that this determines equilibrium outcomes.
4.2 T he m odel
Cultural transmission is seen as a two stage game where first parents choose 
their socialization effort, and then children decide who to establish links with. 
There are two types of cultural traits {1,2} in the population. The fraction of 
individuals with trait i is Pi.
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4.2 .1  N etw ork  form ation
Children choose how many links with individuals of each type to build. As in 
BV children are assumed to be naive and so they cannot influence each other. 
They can form links with children growing in families of different types, or 
with adults. For instance a child from an upper class family can choose friends 
with a lower class background and be exposed to their parents’ cultural traits. 
I retain this interpretation here to avoid the creation of a group of non-naive 
children.
I assume that children always build the same number of links with individ­
uals of their parents’ type. This simplifies the analysis but it can be relaxed 
in different ways. It implies that children do not substitute between friends 
of different types. They rather choose how many friends of the other type to 
have on top of their friends with the same background. Children of the same 
cultural group can be considered to live in the same area and to know each 
other, maybe costlessly, and to decide how many friends of the other neigh­
borhood to have. This does not affect their number of friends from their own 
neighborhood.
The benefit of a new link is constant and independent of the total number 
of links. However the cost of forming a new link increases with the existing 
number of links. As in BV parents prefer their children to have their prefer­
ences. They can influence network formation by modifying the cost of creating 
a link with someone of the other cultural group. Children take this cost as 
given but it will be chosen by parents in the first stage of the game.
The creation of nj direct links with individuals of the other cultural group
( n j ) 2has a benefit njvi and a cost h(ri) ■ where t* is the socialization effort of 
the parents and h is some concave continuously differentiable function with 
h(0) =  1 and h'(0) =  -f-oo. The friend of a friend does not bring any benefit.
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Children choose their number of friends by maximizing their "network" utility 
function, for all i, j  G {1,2}
ui (nl ni) =  fi(K )  +  ni vi -  (4-1)
The function is continuously differentiable and concave. The important 
point is that is separable in n\ and nj. Note also that parents could mod­
ify the benefit Vi (or its perception), and it would yield equivalent results. 
Optimally we have
where hi = h(ri). Henceforth I use the expression "type i children" for 
"children from a family of type i". Type 1 children want to form n\ links with 
type 2 children, who themselves want to form n\ links with type 1 children. 
However the formation of a link requires the consent of both children. It may 
not be possible to build the desired network.
There are TV* type i children, each of them willing to build n\ links with 
the other group. Cultural group i wants to form a total of Nifij links with 
group j ,  and similarly group j  wants to form Njrij links with group i. It is 
feasible if and only if Niuj =  Njrij. If NiTij > Njrij then (at least some) type i 
children must be constrained in their number of links and cannot achieve their 
optimal network size. I will say that type i is constrained when Ninj > 
and write indifferently that parents and children are constrained, but it must 
be understood that children are the ones constrained in their choice. I assume 
that the equilibrium is symmetric such that all the individuals in the same 
group establish the same number of links with the other group. This raises 
the possibility of a number of links that is not an integer. I abstract from this 
difficulty, keep the requirement of a symmetric equilibrium and treat rv- as a
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continuous variable. n\ is assumed to be always feasible. In Proposition 4.1 h? 
indicates the unconstrained choice and nj the constrained optimum.
P ro p o sitio n  4.1 For j  ^  i, i fh J < therm? = nj =  andrij —
For j  7£ i, ifn? > then n{ =  and n) =  h\ =  P-.u • 7 J 1 Pi J 1 Pi J J 3 n j
Proposition 4.1 only rephrases the fact that the constrained group is the 
group that wants to create the largest number of links. Network formation is 
constrained by the decision of the other group. If group i is large and wants 
to build many links with group j  then it is constrained because group j  is. 
not willing to do so. In reality some type i children would form links while 
others would not, but in the model the symmetric equilibrium rules out this 
possibility. A group is constrained under two conditions: it is not sufficient 
that individuals want to form many links, the group must be large enough as 
well. A small group very "open" is unlikely to be constrained in its network 
formation.
Once children have formed their network they are socialized to a cultural 
trait by interacting with individuals of their network. Unlike BV I make oblique 
transmission the result of a decision, instead of being a passive process. I 
assume that type i children are socialized to cultural trait i with a probability 
qi equal to the proportion of type i children in their network.1 It captures the 
fact that by having friends of their own type they are confronted to their own 
environment and to other type i parents, or maybe that they stay in the same 
area and do not learn about other cultures.
P ro p o sitio n  4.2 I f  h{ < I—21h*• then qi =
Pi 3 n \ + n l  '
I f  hi > l—^ h \  then qi = "T-p7
1 Instead of being equal to qi the probability could be some increasing function of qi and 
the results would go through.
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Proposition 4.2 follows directly from Proposition 4.1. The important point 
is that conditional on being constrained, the proportion of same type friends 
is independent on children’s optimal choice.
4 .2 .2  P arents socia liza tion  choice
I follow BV and assume that parents do care about the welfare of their children 
but that they use their own preferences to evaluate their children’s actions. 
Parents exhibit imperfect empathy. They consider that an individual of their 
own type i gets a utility V n and someone of type j  gets V lK The quantity 
Ai = V n — V tj represents their intolerance towards the other type and it is 
positive: parents always prefer their children to be of their own type.
Vertical transmission is summarized by the effort parents exert to shape 
the network built by their children. Families are composed of one parent and 
one child, and the parent maximizes
p i i y i i  +  p i j y i j  _  C (TJ  (4 3)
where is the probability that a child from a type i family is socialized 
to trait j .  C  is continuously differentiable, increasing, convex, and C(0) =  
C '(0 ) =  0 .
Given the assumption about cultural transmission in the network P n =  
and P tj =  1 — When type i children are unconstrained these probabilities 
depend on t*. Otherwise they do not. Parents anticipate this and therefore 
face two possible situations: either their children are constrained in the number 
of friends of the other type they can get, and in this case their effort does not 
influence the probability of socialization to the other trait and any effort is 
useless, or their children are unconstrained and they choose a strictly positive 
effort in order to influence network building.
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Assume first that type i children are unconstrained, the optimal effort from 
parents is given by
C'{ri) == A iq((n) (4.4)
VjTl i  h ' ( T j )
Because of the convexity of C and the concavity oih , (4.4) implicitly defines 
a unique r<. Secondly when type i children are constrained the optimal effort 
is Ti = 0. Note that the unconstrained effort n  is a constant independent of 
Pi-
In the first stage of the game parents have to anticipate whether their 
children will be constrained or not, and this depends on the decisions of parents 
from the other group. This creates an incentive to free ride on the effort of the 
other group in order to make no effort. Parents play a game where their optimal 
action depends on their opponents’ actions. The next section presents results 
when parents do not perfectly understand this game and act in a "naive" way. 
I then investigate how the results must be modified to take into account the 
free riding induced by the game.
In the rest of the article group i is said to be "more intolerant" than group 
j  when n{ = ?*■ < £- = n\?u  1 h i  h j  3
4.3 N aive parents
By naive parents I mean that they compute their optimal unconstrained effort, 
the unconstrained effort of parents from the other group, and check whether
2 It is not always true that A< < A j  implies t* <  tj . It depends on the other parameters 
Vi, Vj,  n \ ,  and nj. The definition used in the article means that an intolerant group is less 
willing to form links with the other group. It disregards whether it results from parents’ 
effort or children tastes. In Section 4.1  I use some parameter restrictions that link directly 
intolerance to A*.
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their children are constrained. If they are then parents optimally do not make 
any effort. Proposition 4.3 describes the equilibrium.
P rop osition  4.3 n\ =  £ ,?<  =  A ,  and t < > 0 if ^
i hi
7J  _  kz2 i.n% q — £  an(i  T — q otherwise.
1 Pi hj
Proposition 4.3 states that when type i children are uncon­
strained (and so type j  children are constrained). It means that when both 
parents choose their optimal unconstrained effort, type i children are uncon­
strained and Ti > 0 is indeed optimal for type i parents. Type j  parents do 
not make any effort: given type i effort it is optimal to do so.3 The intuition 
driving this result is that when cultural group i represents a small fraction of 
the population (p* small) and type j  children are willing to form more links 
than type i children ( ^ f 1 large, this is true in particular when type i parents 
are more intolerant) then type j  children are not able to get as many type 
i friends as they would like. Type j  parents anticipate this outcome in the 
second stage and do not make any effort.
Parents try to curb their children’s decisions if they are part of a minority. 
They fear that their children have a large number of friends from the other 
cultural group and consequently are influenced by them. On the other hand 
the majority feels safe and can rely on the minority’s efforts to avoid undesired 
friendships. This result is similar to an important characteristic of BV model 
that they call cultural substitution between vertical and oblique transmissions. 
Put simply, parents’ effort decreases with the population proportion of their 
cultural group.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the optimal effort and the resulting proportion as 
functions of type i individuals in the population, pi satisfies
l  p<i V i rij
3 What is examined in the next section is that type i parents could also find it optimal 
to choose a zero effort if that induces type j  parents to choose a positive effort.
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/Figure 4.1: Effort and proportion of type i friends
The proportion qi of type i friends, and so the probability of staying a 
type i individual is strictly increasing when pz is large enough (when y^- is 
larger than ^.^i , or equivalently when pt > pi). There are few type j  children 
and through simple shortage the proportion increases. This would occur even 
without parents making any effort. The consequence of parents trying to affect 
the costs and benefits of friendships is to modify ql in their interest. Without 
socialization the proportion qi would be lower and would start increasing at 
a different threshold (for pi is larger than ^ )  that can be smaller or greater 
than the threshold with socialization. On Figure 4.2 is drawn the proportion 
qi when ^  < 1. This is equivalent to t* < Tj, in particular this is the case 
when V{ = Vj and n\ — nJp  but type j  parents are more intolerant Aj > A t. 
The dashed curve corresponds to the regime with socialization, qi is higher 
with socialization than without. Of course this comes at the cost of effort.
If we consider the change from a situation where socialization does not 
exist, or when it is forbidden, then all the parents are better off.4 However less 
intolerant parents benefit from the effort of the most intolerant cultural group: 
for some values of pt they enjoy a much higher proportion qi at no cost. This
4They must be because to allow socialization expands their choice set. They could always 
choose Ti — 0 if that was optimal.
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P i 1 Pi
Figure 4.2: with and without socialization
is never the case for type j  parents. It can be formalized by looking at type i
increases with intolerance, so parents always prefer to face a highly intolerant 
cultural group because they do not have to make any socialization effort. Their 
children almost never meet the other cultural group. W ith infinitely intolerant 
parents they would never try  to influence network formation.
Proposition  4.4 Everything else being equal parents o f cultural group i are 
better o ff when parents o f cultural group j  are more intolerant. Type i parents * 
welfare increases with j f .
4.3.1 D ynam ics
Given the transition probabilities P n and P l\  the evolution of pit is
parents’ welfare for different values of type j  parents’ intolerance. Their welfare
P i t + l  =  PitQ.it +  (1 -  P i t ) { l  ~  Qj t ) (4.5)
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Or equivalently
Pit+i ~  Pit =  ( 1  -  Pit){  1 -  Qjt) ~  Pit(  1 -  Qit) (4.6)
In order to characterize the steady states of equation (4.6), define first "the 
least connected type" as being type i if and only if n \ + Children of 
the least connected type form fewer finks than children from the other cultural 
group.
P ro p o sitio n  4.5 Assume type i is the least connected type.
I f  n\ — n3j +  > 0 then there is a unique steady state p* with 0 < p* < 1;
its basin of attraction is (0,1). When pi = p* the least connected type chooses
a strictly positive effort. 0  and 1 are unstable steady states.
I f  0 > n\ — nJj +  y. t ^ n  (0,1) are steady states and the basin of attraction 
of Pi =  0 is [0,1).
Proposition 4.5 states different points. First there are two possible interior 
steady states. One where type 1 parents do not make any effort, and one where 
type 2  parents do not, depending on who is the least connected type. Second, 
these two equilibria do not coexist as there is only one least connected type 
in the population. Equation (4.6) has at most one interior stationary state .5 
Third, the interior equilibrium is globally stable when it exists, while 0 and 
1 are unstable. When there is no interior steady state the least connected 
type does not survive cultural transmission. Finally the most connected group 
always free rides on the socialization effort of the least connected group in 
steady state.
The exercise of increasing type j  intolerance while holding everything else
5 When n\ +  ^  =  n3j  +  there axe actually two stable interior equilibria. In each of 
them but in the first equilibrium only type i parents choose a strictly positive
effort, only type j  parents do so in the second.
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constant is repeated. Assume that type i is the least connected type. Two 
cases have to be considered. First if 0 > — nj +  type i is the least
connected type for every intolerance level and the only stable steady state is 
Pi — 0. Second if nj — nj +  > 0, for large enough intolerance type j  is
the least connected type. As long as i is the least connected type the steady 
state is fixed and type i parents’ welfare is constant. Above some intolerance 
threshold type j  is the least connected type. In steady state type i parents 
stop making any effort and their proportion in the steady state increases with 
j i .  From Proposition 4.4 they also enjoy a higher welfare for a given group 
size. Eventually it could be that 0 > nj — n\ +  and the only stable steady 
state would be pi = 1. Thus it is better to face a highly intolerant group 
for two reasons: not only it increases welfare but in the long run that group 
might disappear. However intolerant cultural group can survive by being well 
connected internally (nj large), such that the condition 0  > nj — nj +  g- is 
never satisfied. A group whose size shrinks may actually take measures to 
make its members more connected, focus on its internal identity and on the 
importance of establishing links among its members in order to survive cultural 
transmission.6
There seems to be a paradox in Proposition 4.5 as a highly intolerant group 
may disappear. It contrasts with the typical BV model where intolerance usu­
ally increases group size in equilibrium because it induces a high socialization 
effort in each period. This result actually underlines the importance of the 
total number of links in this type of model. An intolerant group with poor 
intra-connections is bound to disappear, whereas a group similar but highly 
connected internally is present in the steady state. Two mechanisms explain
6 Two last cases have to be mentioned. When n\ =  nj the steady state pi =  \  always 
exists and is stable. Intolerance only determines which group makes some positive effort in 
steady state. Second when — 0  it implies that =  qj =  1 and so any initial point is a 
steady state.
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this result. Intolerance, everything else being equal, increases socialization 
effort and so the proportion of intragroup friends. But it also brings some im­
pediment to cultural transmission because it prevents socialization of children 
from families of the other group. A group closed to cultural influences is able 
to transmit efficiently its own set of cultural traits but it is unable to dissemi­
nate it to other cultural groups. It relies mostly on intra cultural transmission 
to survive, but this fails when intra connections are weak. The risk for a group 
of being too closed is expressed by the condition 0 > n\ — nj +  It requires 
in particular that nj > nj, such that type i children not only have a smaller 
total number of links, but also a smaller number of internal connections. This 
is the condition for a group to disappear. The condition 0  >  raj -  nj +  £  also 
implies that a group is less likely to vanish without socialization effort (when 
hi — 1 ). Intolerance from parents can be damaging for the culture they want 
to transmit: they can always fail with their own children ($ is always smaller 
than one), and they fail to transmit it to people outside their group.
4.4 R ational parents
In this section parents perfectly understand the nature of the game they play 
with the other cultural groups. In the first stage of the cultural transmission 
game they do not only consider the situation where both types of parents 
choose their optimal effort to understand which children are constrained in 
their network formation. They* realize that it may be possible for them to 
"force" the other cultural group to choose a positive effort. Regardless of the 
equilibrium parents’ efforts, they must be in a situation where only one cultural 
group is constrained. We know that optimally the constrained parents must 
choose a zero effort. If they are unconstrained then the optimal choice is r*. 
The strategy space in equilibrium is therefore restricted to {t*, 0}. Equilibrium
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symmetry allows us to denote an equilibrium (t*, Tj) where is the equilibrium 
strategy of all the type i parents.
I now consider the Nash equilibrium in socialization efforts when > 1 . 
It is equivalent to Ti > Tj.
P ro p o sitio n  4.6 There exist pi and p2 in (0,1), with ^Ljy-,
^  < t22— < ^-hi, and p\ < p2 such that:
Vi 1 ~ P 2  Vi
• When pi < pi the only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is (Ti, 0).
• When pi < pi < p2 both (r^O) and (0, Tj) are Nash equilibrium in pure 
strategies.
• When p2 < Pi the only Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is (0, Tj).
With naive parents (0, Ti) is the equilibrium when pi < pi. It is (0, Tj) 
otherwise. Proposition 4.6 establishes that with rational parents (0 , 7y) is 
always a Nash equilibrium (and may be the only one) on some interval where 
Pi < pi. There always exists a zero effort equilibrium for group i below the
naive threshold pi when Ti > Tj. It is not necessarily the case for the other
cultural group (p2 can be below pi and if it is then (t*, 0 ) is never an equilibrium 
when Pi > pi).
Figure 4.3 pictures the equilibria for the different values of pi. Compared 
to the naive case, the game between rational parents always expands the range 
of values where (0 , Tj) is an equilibrium, but can either expand or shrink the 
range where (rz, 0) is an equilibrium. The important conclusion is that the 
game must have' two Nash equilibria on a non-empty interval.
Rational parents make use of the switch between being constrained or not 
and they swicth between zero and positive effort. Consider pi smaller than 
but close to the naive threshold. Type i parents may prefer to deviate from
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(T„0) (0 ,T y)
\— ► Naive parents
i Pi
H------ 1— i-------------------------1— ► Rational parents
Pi Pi ?  i p‘ P l < p
< .«>  .---------
-------------1-----------1------ 1------------------- 1— ► Rational parents
Pi p  Pi i Pi P l > p
Figure 4.3: Nash equilibrium in pure strategies when T i  > T j .
the naive equilibrium (r^, 0) by choosing a zero effort. That decreases the 
probability that their children adopt their trait. They also become constrained. 
Had they stayed unconstrained, the fall in ^  would have been larger. The 
benefit of the deviation is that parents do not suffer any cost. If the cost of Tj 
is large then the deviation can be profitable. Naive parents do no understand 
the switch constrained/unconstrained associated with zero/positive effort, and 
so never see a deviation as profitable. I provide in the appendix a longer 
explanation in the appendix, along with the proof of Proposition 4.6.
Cultural group i is assured of the existence of a zero effort level below the 
naive threshold, but we have not said anything about the preferred equilibrium 
for each type of parents. The zero effort equilibrium exists but it may not be 
desirable for any group. Proposition 4.7 states that parents always prefer the 
zero effort equilibrium.
P ro p o sitio n  4.7 I f  there are two Nash equilibria then parents prefer the equi­
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librium where they make zero effort.
I f  there is only one Nash equilibrium then it maximizes the payoffs for both 
types of parents.
When there are two equilibria there is a conflict of interest between the 
two cultural groups as they prefer the other group to make some effort and to 
free ride on it. If parents could choose the equilibrium when both exist then 
they would not agree. We need some mechanism to select the equilibrium. I 
investigate below the case where the equilibrium is chosen by majority voting.
The second part of Proposition 4.7 states that when it is unique the Nash 
equilibrium is payoff maximizing for all parents. They do not prefer any other 
non equilibrium outcome.
4.4 .1  P o litica l equilibrium
I restrict children of both types to be identical, with n\ =  nj and Vi = Vj. In 
the absence of socialization type % children would be unconstrained for Px 1 / 2  
and constrained otherwise. Type i parents are assumed to be more intolerant 
than type j ,  A* > A j. It implies that they choose a higher socialization effort 
when they are unconstrained r % > Tj.1
When ( t *, 0) and (0, Tj) are Nash equilibria the largest group in the pop­
ulation chooses its preferred equilibrium. The outcome is chosen by majority 
voting. Alternatively the majority may be able to commit to a strategy in or­
der to pick up its preferred equilibrium (type i parents would credibly commit 
to a zero effort), or to play first in a two stage game. If there is only one Nash 
equilibrium then it is automatically implemented.
7The general case without any restrictions on the paramaters is similar and would consider 
that group i is said to be more intolerant when & < £ •
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When is smaller than ^  =  1, group j  is the largest (pi < | )  and it can 
choose the equilibrium when there are two Nash equilibria. Using Proposition 
4.6, for Pi small enough ( t ,^ 0) is the only Nash equilibrium. For larger values 
of pi it may be that (0 , Tj) is an equilibrium but it is never chosen by the 
majority, (t*, 0 ) is the equilibrium for every Pi < \ .
When pi > \  group i has the majority. When it is a short majority (pi close 
enough to | )  either ( t * ,  0) and (0, Tj) are equilibrium or only ( t * ,  0). If parents 
have the choice they go for the zero effort equilibrium (0, T j ) .  If not, ( r i} 0) is 
implemented even though type i group represents the majority. Finally when 
Pi  is large the only Nash equilibrium is (0, T j ) .  Proposition 4.8 summarizes 
these results.
P rop osition  4.8 There exists p3, with |  <  p3 < pi7 such that the political 
equilibrium is (t*, 0 ) whenpi < p 3, and (0 , T j )  otherwise.
Corollary: When p z>  \  the outcome preferred by group i is always im­
plemented.
Consider first the corollary. If p3 > \  then ( 0 ,  Tj) is never a Nash equi­
librium when group j  constitutes a majority. There is a conflict of interest 
between the two groups only when group i is a majority and so ( 0 , T j )  is al­
ways implemented when groups disagree. The outcome preferred by group i is 
always the political equilibrium. In the case with p3 =  | ,  ( 0 ,  T j )  starts being 
an equilibrium when Pi and group j  chooses not to implement it. When 
Pi  >  \  group i is a majority and chooses ( 0 ,  T j )  while ( t^ ,  0 )  is still an equilib­
rium. In other words there is an interval I such that \  E I and when Pi E I the 
majority chooses the equilibrium not preferred by the minority. Both groups 
"suffer" from the political process, while with p3 > |  only group j  does. I will 
come back later to this point when looking at welfare.
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Two possibilities emerge from Proposition 4.8, either with p3 =  |  or with 
P z >  First, the majority group implements its zero effort equilibrium. It free 
rides on the other group. Second, the less intolerant group always implements 
its zero effort equilibrium but the most intolerant group does only so when 
it represents a large majority (pi > p3 > |) .  It prefers to make a positive 
socialization effort for pi close to \  precisely because it is more intolerant. If it 
relies on group j  to make some effort it is not satisfied by the outcome. Type 
j  parents make a too small effort from type i parents’ point of view and as 
a consequence their children have too many friends from the other cultural 
group. For pi large, type i group size makes contacts with people from the 
other group unlikely and so parents can stop making any effort. The next 
proposition follows directly from this argument.
P ro p o sitio n  4.9 p3 is a decreasing function of A j .
When group j  becomes more intolerant group i can free ride on its effort 
for smaller group sizes. It can do so eventually as soon as it is a majority 
(P3 =  {)■
4.4 .2  W elfare
I repeat the analysis of the last section by considering whether group i would 
like to face a more intolerant group than it is itself. I am still using the 
restrictions made to study the political equilibrium, with children of both 
cultural groups being identical. Consider a type i parent and increase A j 
for a given Pi. Compared to the case with naive parents we now have to 
take into account the political equilibrium, but actually it does not affect the 
result. If before and after the change the equilibrium is (r^, 0) then welfare is 
unchanged. If the equilibrium is (0, Tj) then welfare increases, because qi does. 
If the equilibrium switches from (r^, 0) to (0, Tj), then again welfare increases,
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as in the naive case. Welfare would fall if equilibrium switched from (0, Tj) to 
(Ti, 0) but because of p3 decreasing with A j it cannot happen.
Therefore group i always prefers to face a highly intolerant group. I claimed 
above that the most intolerant group does not necessarily "suffer11 from the 
political process while the other always does. It is still correct in the sense that 
when group i is much more intolerant than group j  its preferred outcome is 
always the political equilibrium. This is not true when it is less intolerant but 
the outcome still makes group i parents better off. They may be disappointed 
that their preferred outcome is not implemented but their welfare cannot be 
lower than if group j  was less intolerant.
P ro p o sitio n  4.10 Everything else being equal the more intolerant cultural 
group j  parents are, the higher is cultural group i parents ’ welfare.
Intolerance from the other group allows free riding and this always increases 
welfare.8
4 .4 .3  D ynam ics
Equation (4.6) is still valid. In the general case where Vi ^  Vj and n\ ^  nj 
Proposition 4.8 holds but the result \  < ps < pi is replaced by a weaker version 
< T22- < ^ hi. With naive parents equation (4.6) has only one stable
V i  r l j  1 V i
steady state. However with rational parents and the political process there 
can be two, one, or even no stable steady states.
Define p* =  —-—r  if +  n) — nj > 0 and p* =  0 otherwise, and1 2-rL+n-—n- Hi 1 Jh.i i 3
ZL
P i *  = v, % — r if +  nj — n\ > 0 and p J* =  1 otherwise . These type i^ 1 hj 3 j s'
j  J  %
proportions are the two possible interior steady states of equation (4.6). p*
8 Note also that children otherwise identical prefer to be in a family from the least intol­
erant group.
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is such that the effort equilibrium is (r^O), and p** such that it is (0, Tj). 
Proposition 4.11 describes all the possible steady states.
P ro p o sitio n  4.11 Assume that ^  < t 2-.
tt'i fh j
• When type i is the least connected type, the naive steady state would be 
p*. With rational parents and the political process:
-  I fn\  < n] :
* I f  Ps < P* the steady state is p** < | .
* I f  Pi < P3 < p** there are two steady states: p* and p**, with
Pt < pT <
* i f p r  < ps the steady state is p* < | .
-  I fni  > nj :
* I f  ps < p** the steady state is p** > | .
* i f p r  < P3 < Pi there is no steady state.
* IfP*i < ps the steady state is p* > -.
• When type j  is the least connected type, it must be that n\ > n3- and the 
steady state is p** > |  (and it is also the naive steady state).
The role of the political process can be clarified for the cases where it affects 
the outcome. Assume first that type i is the least connected type. If n\ < n j , 
the political equilibrium may rule out a steady state when p** < Ps- PT may 
be a steady state, with Nash equilibrium (0 , Tj). However p** is below |  such 
that group i does not represent the majority in this equilibrium. If both (r2, 0) 
and (0, Tj) are Nash equilibria the majority will select (t*, 0) and p** is not an 
equilibrium. By doing so the j  majority avoids the steady state where its size 
is smaller (as p* < p**) and picks up its preferred steady state.
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Assume still that type i is the least connected type but that n\ > n3-. When 
Pi* <  P3 < Pi there is no steady state because of the political process. If the 
majority of type i individuals chose the Nash equilibrium ( t * ,  0) instead of 
(0 , Tj), p* would be a steady state. Instead it prefers the zero effort Nash 
equilibrium (0 , T j )  and this blocks the emergence of a steady state.
When there are two steady states initial conditions matter. When there 
is none, cycles appear around p3. For pit smaller than p3, pu+i — Pa > 0, 
but when pit becomes larger than p3 it decreases, until it falls below p3, and 
increases again. The two Nash equilibria are alternatively implemented and 
these cycles can also induce changes in the majority in each period.
The last bullet point of the proposition refers to the situation where type 
j  is the least connected type and is also less connected "internally". In the 
steady state the political equilibrium is (0 , T j )  and there is a majority of type 
i individuals. Cultural group z, even though it is less tolerant <  £ ) > can 
free ride on group j  because it is poorly connected.
When we studied the political equilibrium I assumed that children from 
both cultural groups were identical, with n\ =  n3j and Vi = Vj. It also implies 
that p* = p** = | ,  and the least connected type is the most intolerant group. 
Using Proposition 4.11, if p3 > i  the steady state is at p* =  \  and ( t ^ O )  is 
implemented. On the other hand when p3 = \  there are two steady states, at 
the same proportion pi =  | ,  but the Nash equilibrium in socialization efforts is 
either ( t * ,  0) or (0, T j ) .  p* is preferred by type i parents, p** by type j  parents. 
Because no group has a strict majority both outcomes are feasible and there 
is a tension between the two cultural groups as each wants to free ride on the 
other.9
9 Mixed strategy equilibrium may arise in this situation.
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4.5 C onclusion
The model has been voluntarily chosen to be very simple. However it allows 
some non trivial developments: it creates a game between parents that may 
have multiple Nash equilibria. I showed how intolerance plays an important 
role in determining the outcome of this game and how it influences the political 
equilibrium. In particular parents from the least intolerant group suffer from 
a disadvantage in equilibrium selection because they are not able to always 
enforce their preferred outcome. Despite this drawback, I also showed that 
parents’ welfare increases with the intolerance of the other group. Finally the 
dynamics of cultural transmission yield different steady states for a popula­
tion. The political process plays an important role by sometimes elhninating 
a potential steady state. It can lead to cycles that do not converge.
While this extension is very preliminary and does not build precisely upon 
the recent findings in network theory, it still underlines the importance of 
some characteristics in network formation such as the total number of links an 
individual forms, or the number of connections inside its own cultural group. 
These drive whether a type survives cultural transmission. The model shows 
how intolerance preserves a cultural group from external influences and so 
contributes to its pereniality, but at the same time prevents its expansion.
Many extensions are to be explored: non-separability in the choice of intra 
and intergroup connections, benefits of establishing a link as functions of group 
sizes, and shape of the network. More importantly, the main research agenda 
is to understand how social groups influence the formation of individual pref­
erences, and how cultural groups structure themselves in order to be present 
in the next generations.
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4.6  A ppendix
P roofs o f  P ropositions 4.1 and 4.2
When they maximize their own utility type i children want each to build 
nj links with group j  children. This makes a  total of Nih\ links. On the other 
hand type j  children want to build a total of Njh* links. This problem can be 
seen as having two sets, one with Nihj points, and the other with Nj hj . We 
want to find a bijective function between the two sets. This is feasible only 
if they have the same cardinal. If Nihj < NjfiJ- we can find an injective but 
non surjective function from the first to the second set. There is no injective 
function from the second to the first set of points. In this case type j  is said to 
be constrained and some type j  children cannot achieve their desired number 
of links. Since I consider '’non-integer" finks to have symmetric individuals, 
this proves Proposition 4.1. Proposition 4.2 follows directly.
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  4.3
If type i is unconstrained then the optimal effort is given by (4.4). If it 
is constrained they maximize PnV% +  — C(ri) with Pil and P1* being
independent of effort. Their optimal choice is therefore a zero effort.
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  4 .4
A graphical illustration of the problem is helpful. Notice first that the 
utility of a type i parent can be written Vlj +  A & — C(ri).  When type j  
intolerance, measured by varies it does not affect P*J', Aj, and Tj. Figure 
4.4 displays V lj +  A &  as a function of pi. The dashed curve corresponds to 
a higher type j  intolerance. We know that type i parents make a positive 
effort as long as It corresponds to the flat part of the curves
and the threshold for this to hold is decreasing with type j  intolerance. This 
explains why the high intolerance curve steeps up before the low intolerance
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curve. Similarly higher intolerance implies tha t the dashed high intolerance 
curve is always above the low intolerance curve.
V lj +  A iqi is therefore increasing with type j  intolerance. The reason is 
that type i children are "more" constrained when type j  parents are more 
intolerant. We have now to take into account the cost of effort C{ti ). When 
the two curves are flat, or strictly increasing, the costs are the same under low 
and high intolerance. However when only the high intolerance curve is not flat 
the cost is strictly smaller under this regime, since there is none. It results 
that for every pi type i parents welfare V lj +  A &  — C(ri)  cannot be smaller 
under high intolerance from type j  parents.
P ro o f of P roposition  4.5
Equation (4.6) is defined piecewise on [0,1], with different specifications on 
[0,pi] and [p», 1]. When we solve for stationary states, we find two possible 
interior equilibria: p * =  A -— —3— tha t corresponds to a regime where type i
2T7l+ni~nj
1
Figure 4.4: V ij +  Atf*
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is unconstrained (so with positive type i effort), second p** = 2^ +^j ni whent
type i is constrained and make zero effort.
p* exists as a stationary states if and only if it is in [0,pi\. This condition
is equivalent to 0  < n\ — nj +  jj^  <
Similarly p** exists if and only if it is in [p*, 1], or equivalently 0  <  n] -
First, these two equilibria do not coexist and so there is at most a unique 
interior stationary state. Second, if it exists then the least connected type is 
unconstrained in steady state and so makes a strictly positive effort. Third, if
Finally, assume that there is an interior steady state p. From equation (4.6) 
Pit+1 — Pit > 0 if and only if 0 < pa < p  < 1, and so p  has basin of attraction 
(0,1). 0 and 1 are unstable steady states. If there is no steady state then from
(4.6) and assuming that i is the least connected type, Pu+i — Pu < 0 when
unstable steady state.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  4.6
Parents choose either to make effort r* or 0, depending on whether they 
are constrained or not. First introduce the notation Ci =  C(ji)  for i E {1 ,2 } . 
Ci is positive and it can be bounded above by using the fact that is optimal 
when type i  is unconstrained. Therefore it must be that type i parents get a 
higher utility with t* than with a zero effort when they are unconstrained:
Different cases have to be considered. Each time the only two possible
0  > n\ — n3j + Y. and i is the least connected type then it does not exist.
Pu > 0. Hence 0 is a steady state with basin of attraction [0,1) and 1 is an
(4.7)
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Nash equilibria are (Tj,0) and (0, Tj).
# _Pi_ < 2iJL1 Pi ^  hj
Regardless of type i and j  strategies, type i is always the constrained type 
(because So it is a dominant strategy for type i
parents to choose t*. Given that it is optimal for type j  parents not to make
any effort. The only Nash equilibrium is (ri: 0).
# 2i i < < v- ihi
V i  h j  1 — p i  V i  V i  h j  V i  1
For these values of pi type j  is constrained only when the strategies are
(0, T j ) .  The payoff matrix is
0 r3
0 Vij +  A Vji +7’n\+vi ’
A n i'A .—2----
J nj + T^ plVi




Ti V* +  Ai^As; -  Ci, Vji +i hi
A niA .— 2----
V* +  A , ^  -  Ci, V* +ni+hi
nja . j r*3 „i | Pi n 3^ j 1 —Pi hi
(rj, 0) is always a Nash equilibrium because type i parents prefer n  to 0
by a revealed preference argument. Type j  parents are better off free riding
and so do not deviate.
■ 1—p • 1 hThe conditions for (0, Tj) for being a Nash equilibrium are that AjW,-,---------  2-------->
1 — P j  V j  V j
Cj and that Ci > A in)-?----- Pl.—J h   The first condition is never satisfied
for close enough to and using (4.7) it must be satisfied for close 
enough to The second condition is not satisfied for low values of pi, and 
may be for higher values. (0 , Tj) may be an equilibrium, depending on the
parameters.
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Si > < 2. < JL_ < l i t  < 2 ^
v* n j  Vi l —P i  Vi h j  Vi 1
0 T 3
0 V** +  A i-— ^ — , .V *  +
n\-\------^ V j1 Pi 3
a  ni  
A  j  jJ n3 +Vj
V ij +  A V»  +
1 Pi ^
~  C3
T i V ij + -  Ci, Vji +
i '  hi
A n i/ \  ■ —i---------2-------------
3 nJ,  p*
j '  l-p ,-  hi
v v  +  A * - ^  -  Ci, V *  +
* h^
n3A . 2________ n
3 n3 -L —Ei— Hi. ^ 3nj ^  l - p ,  hi
(t^  0) is Nash equilibrium under the condition that Ci < Ain\
It is always satisfied for y^- close enough to ^  (and may be on the whole in­
terval).
1 - P i  V j  V j
( 0 ,T j )  is Nash equilibrium if Ci > A^n\-?---------Pl \   -. It must be
("1+ ^  £ )(" !+ £ )
satisfied for — close enough to ^ r 1.
I —P i  G  Vi h j
So potentially there are two Nash equilibria, one, or none. It is easy to 
show that at least one of these conditions must be satisfied, such that there is 
always at least one Nash equilibrium. Similarly there always exist values for 
Pi such that both conditions are satisfied.
HJL <  2z. <  <  -2L- <
Vi h Vi h l ~ P i  Vi
Similarly to the other cases, ( 0 , T j )  is always a Nash equilibrium. (r^O)
i -Pi
is Nash if a  < and Ci > A i nr------h‘. f t   ^ • The
first condition may be satisfied for low values of pi7 but is never for high values. 
The second condition is always for low values, but never for high values of pi.
• ^  ^  < 2-hi < y^-v-i h j  Vi Vi h j  Vi 1 1—p i
(0, Tj) is the only Nash equilibrium.
Putting all these results together, we obtain Proposition 4.6.
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The existence of different equilibria with naive and rational parents is now 
explained with more details than in Section 4.4. When pi is smaller but close 
enough to the naive threshold, (t*, 0) may not be a Nash equilibrium because 
type i parents may prefer to deviate and choose a zero effort. This deviation 
decreases the proportion of type i individuals in their children network. 
However type i children are now constrained and so the fall in qi is not as 
large as if they were unconstrained and with a zero effort from their parents. 
On the other hand parents do not have to suffer any cost. This move may be 
profitable if the cost of t* is large enough. The crucial feature for this situation 
to exist is that the deviation induces a switch between the two regimes type i /  
type j  constrained, in other words because <  J-f1- Naive parents do
not take this into account. Figure 4.5 explains graphically the maximization 
problem of type i parents for this range of p{. Their utility function can be
XI iwritten V lJ +  A &  — C(rj). On this figure ^(t^) =  ‘ t ^  is the proportion
n i + hi
of type i friends assuming type i is unconstrained. <fc(0 ) =  . \ jPi Vj is the
H i+  P i 1 hj
same proportion but with a zero effort. The optimal effort r* is such that 
the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of effort, or graphically when 
V li +  A iqi(Ti) and C(r^) have the same slope. The level of utility reached at 
this point is Ui(r*). When parents of both types do not make any effort, type 
i children are constrained and their parents get a utility Vy’ +  A*ft(0). It must 
be lower than V lj +  A ^ fr* )  because ^  < r 2*- < However there is noVi I —Pi Vi h j
cost attached to it. We can see on Figure 4.5 that it may be profitable for 
parents to choose a zero effort instead of r*. The horizontal line V lj +  Aj^(0) 
moves up with while everything else is unaffected. 10 The higher Pi is, the 
more likely it is that type i parents deviate from (r^O). Had we assumed 
r 21- < — < the deviation would leave type i children unconstrained and
1 ~ Pi Vi Vi h j , J  *
10 For larger values of Pi cultural group i is larger, and cultural group j  smaller. Type i 
children are therefore "more" constrained because they have to "share" a smaller number 
of type j  friends. #;(0) increases with pi.
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y*j +  Aj^(O) would be at the same level than V *J' +  A ^ (t* )  when no effort is 
made. Type i parents would never deviate by optimality of r*.
U / 0 )
Figure 4.5: Utility levels with positive and zero efforts
Similarly (0,Tj) is a Nash equilibrium for Pi close enough to the naive 
threshold. Type j  parents do not want to deviate. If they do they are still 
constrained and their optimal choice in this regime is Tj. Type i parents are 
willing to deviate if the rise in qi compensates the cost of t*. If the cost of t* is 
large enough then the move is not profitable and (0, Tj) is a Nash equilibrium. 
It can be shown that if pi is smaller but close to the naive threshold then the 
cost must be large enough, because the rise in is small and so the deviation is 
never profitable. Here again this situation exists because of the switch between 
constrained and unconstrained regime, or because° ’ Vi hj I—Pi Vi hj
P ro o f of P roposition  4.7
Consider the case with two Nash equilibria and refer to the payoff matrix
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of the case ^  < t 21-  < < ^-hi in the proof above. If type iVi h j  V{ 1—pi Vi h j  Vi ‘ ^  J  ^
parents were allowed to choose between the two equilibria, they would have 
to compare, V t3 +  A*-5% r — Ci, their payoff in (r*, 0) to V %3 +  A$- :■■ \ lv. Vj , 
their payoff in (0, T j ) .  But that first payoff is also their payoff in ( t » , T j )  and 
because (0 , t \ )  is a Nash equilibrium, it must be that V 13 +  A, — Ci <
n i + hi
V %3 +  Aj . i - p — ■ A perfectly symmetric argument holds for type j  parents.
n i +  ~ p f  hj
Parents consequently prefer the Nash equilibrium where they make zero effort, 
when two Nash equilibria exist.
When there is only one Nash equilibrium, for instance (r^, 0), type i parents 
are better off than in (0,0) because (r*, 0) is Nash, and than in (0, T j )  because 
it is not an equilibrium. They are indifferent between (r^O) and (t*, T j ) .  On 
the other hand type j  parents must be better off than in (0 , T j )  and ( t * ,  T j )  
because (r^O) is Nash, and than in (0,0) because r 21-  < So a unique
'  '  '  '  1 Pi
Nash equilibrium maximizes the payoffs of all the parents.
P ro o f o f  P roposition  4.11
The different solutions derive from noticing that n\ < nJj iff Pi < Pi* < b  
and from using the definition of p3 .
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Chapter 5
Common property resource 
privatization and labor 
allocation
5.1 Introduction
During the last decades, there has been much debate on common property 
resources (CPR). The seminal article by Hardin (1968) regards commons as a 
damaging way of exploiting a resource unless population density is very low. 
Under a growing population it ultimately leads to its ruin when the resource 
starts to become scarce. Common ownership strengthens depletion because 
users do not internalize the impact of their action on the return to others. This 
is a classical example of institution failure. Therefore according to Hardin, the 
tragedy of the commons can only be averted by a different institution, private 
property, that offers well defined property rights. Private ownership makes 
people internalize the social impact of their acts and allocates the optimal 
quantity of labor to the resource in order to reach the first best outcome.
By solving the tragedy of commons, privatization reduces labor allocation
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on the privately held resource. This chapter considers the impact of this la­
bor shift in a complex environment with two resources, land and forest in the 
following example. Initially, both are under communal tenure and subject to 
the tragedy of commons. Due to state intervention private property rights are 
established on land. This reduces labor use on land and shifts some individ­
uals to the forest, still under common property regime. This in turn worsens 
overexploitation of the remaining CPR and lowers the payoff individuals are 
able to extract from it. A crucial feature is that this payoff determines the 
equilibrium wage on land. This creates a link through labor supply between 
the two resources such that the return to labor decreases after privatization. 
The forest is more depleted and people working on it must be made worse 
off. Overexploitation in the forest may have also negative consequences on 
privatized land in an ecosystem (through, for instance, worse water supply, or 
erosion leading to increased risk of land slides). This technological link be­
tween resources imposes a negative externality on land that is exacerbated by 
privatization.
Even though labor is made worse off after privatization, the rents extracted 
from private ownership may be sufficient to compensate for the fall in labor 
return and thus increase welfare. If the distribution of property rights is equi­
table, such that each individual is entitled to receive an ownership rent, then 
privatization would be a Pareto improvement. The argument in this chapter 
is that this result does not necessarily hold when labor moves to the congested 
remaining CPR, even with an equal allocation of property rights. Welfare may 
decrease after privatization.
The chapter derives also results on privatization design by introducing het­
erogeneity among agents regarding their skills on land. Some have a higher 
productivity. Privatization is seen as a promoter of this skill, making it more 
productive under private tenure. This is to recognize that land titling has some
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beneficial effects that are not included otherwise in the model (tenure security, 
availability of a collateral for a loan). If skills are high enough, land reform 
may actually increase the return to labor. In any case, two results are proved. 
First, the depletion of the CPR (forest in the example) is minimized when 
land is distributed exclusively to skilled individuals. Being more productive, 
they have a larger labor demand than unskilled landowners and reduce the 
quantity of labor on the CPR. Second, welfare is maximized under the same 
land distribution, but it may still be smaller than before the land reform.
Finally inequality in skills is shown to reduce the benefits of privatization. 
This argues for measures designed to improve skills, in order to use them fully 
under private tenure.
The setting of the model applies to the numerous cases where a resource 
cannot be privatized, for instance because of economies of scale (Baland and 
Platteau 2003). The costs of defining and enforcing private property rights 
may be very high, particularly when the resource is extended spatially, or if 
it is part of an ecosystem. Forest, mangroves, and grazing meadows are good 
examples. Even when rights can be easily defined, risk pooling considerations 
may make division of the resource suboptimal when it has a low predictability 
(high variance of the value per unit of time per unit area, Dasgupta 1993). On 
the other hand, resources with high predictability and high average value per 
unit area tend to be held under private property.
Netting (1981) docmnents in his study of the Swiss Alps a situation where a 
resource is optimally private while the other is common: the summer pastures 
are communal while the fertile lands, more easily accessible, and concentrated, 
are privately owned.
The result that labor allocation and returns to labor decrease after priva­
tization is well known in the literature (Weitzman 1974, Baland and Francois 
2005, see De Meza and Gould, 1985, and Brito et al., 1997, for situations where
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this does not hold), even though it relies on slightly different grounds in this 
chapter because it is driven by the congestion effect. Weitzman and Cohen 
(1974) confirm the prediction of a fall in returns to labor by considering the 
enclosure movement in medieval England.
The fall in employment is also acknowledged in case studies, for instance 
in Kisamba-Mugerwa (1998). Looking at property rights in Uganda, it argues 
that privatization may increase unemployment. Jodha (1985), in his study of 
common property resources in India, documents how privatization of former 
CPRs led to over crowding and over exploitation of remaining CPRs, illustrat­
ing the fact that labor goes to a second, and non privatized, CPR subject to 
congestion.
The negative externality imposed on the privatized resource by the over­
exploitation of the CPR is not necessary to get any of the results presented in 
this chapter but it serves as a simple device to exemplify the interconnection 
of environmental resources, and how it can reinforce or alleviate some effects. 
While one could give a much more complete survey of how resources can in­
fluence each other through their exploitation, it is not the point in this article. 
Two examples are briefly given as an illustration. Clarke, Reed and Shresta 
(1993) argue that forests convey beneficial externalities on both users and non 
users through their complementary role in facilitating agricultural production. 
Mangroves also constitute a good example of a resource usually under common 
property tenure that is part of an overall ecosystem. They reduce the effects 
of flooding, storm surges, and erosion of coastal land that may be used for 
agricultural purposes. More subtle interactions may also intervene. If people 
allocate their time between the two resources, and if more time must be spent 
on the remaining CPR for a given payoff because of overexploitation, then 
there may be a drop in agricultural productivity. Secondly, CPRs serve as a 
cushion when private resources fail to meet needs. If these common resources
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are more degraded, they lose this ability (Jodha (1995)) and people can be 
worse off. When landowners face negative shocks on their land, they turn to 
the CPR. But if these are more depleted because of the former privatization, 
they suffer a loss.
One does not have necessarily to consider a second CPR to make sense of 
the model. The determining feature is that the outside opportunity is con­
gested. Another CPR is a possible and classic example but alternatives can 
be examined. If the flow of labor increases competition between workers in an 
outside manufacturing activity, wages can go down and the consequences are 
identical. The model also yields the same results when there is a positive ex­
ternality on the privatized resource, and so covers many possible links between 
the two sectors.
The advantages of common property have already been underlined in the 
literature. Usually these rely on economies of scale (Baland and Platteau, 
2003), risk pooling considerations when production is subject to idiosyncratic 
shocks (Carter, 1987), or insurance properties (Baland and Francois, 2005). 
The argument in this chapter does not build on these elements, but rather on 
the simple idea that by reducing labor, privatization forces people to use their 
outside opportunity and that this may respond negatively to the flow of new 
workers. Cohen and Weitzman (1975) are close to the results in this chapter 
but they consider an economy with two sectors, agriculture and manufacturing. 
Although privatization increases national product in the economy, workers do 
not benefit from it because they do not have access to the rents generated 
by the reform. This chapter makes a stronger case by allowing workers to be 
landowners as well, and so to extract the rent. Contrary to Weitzman and 
Cohen results, it is demonstrated that welfare (defined as the sum of all the 
incomes, so equivalent to national product) does not necessarily increases.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2  outlines
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the framework for my analysis. Section 3 investigates the case where agents 
are homogeneous. Then section 4 presents the results with heterogeneous 
agents. Section 5 and 6  consider the influence of the privatization design. 
Section 7 examines the effect of skills inequality. Section 8  provides some 
further discussion on multiple equilibria in the model. Section 9 concludes and 
discusses the implications of the model for property rights reform.
5.2 T he m odel
Consider a closed economy with L agents endowed with one unit of labor 
that is supplied inelastically. There are two CPRs R\ and R 2 in the economy 
such that resource Ri is privatizable whereas R 2 is not. Furthermore, R2 is 
subject to congestion, labor is mobile between the two sites. The amount of 
CPR R\ is fixed and equal to K . Good 1 can be produced from R\ and labor L 
using a constant returns to scale production function Y (K , L) that is strictly 
increasing, concave in L and continuously differentiable. Good 2  is produced 
with R2 and requires only labor. The payoff for each agent working on R 2 is 
g(L), with g'(L) > 0 where L is labor allocated to R\ (congestion effect).
The production of good 2 generates a negative externality 'ip(L) (-0 is a 
continuous function of L and 'ip'(L) > 0) 12 on the production of good 1, such 
that the production function is altered to Y (K , L)'ip(L). The crucial feature 
for the results is that g increases with L. If ip is a constant, or even ip'(L) < 0,
all the results still hold.
1To keep a small number of variables, g and ip are functions of L, the number of people 
working on R \.  This is why it is an increasing function of L. However g and ip should be 
more rigorously considered as functions of L — L, with <  0 and <  0.
2It may not be obvious that ip' >  0 . It could be imagined that whatever the number of 
workers on R 2 they always produce the same output and therefore create the same negative 
externality. A simple model with a congested CPR is developed in the Appendix to show 
that ip' >  0 can be easily justified.
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A basic model with homogeneous agents based on Baland and Francois 
(2005) is first presented. Then a more general framework with heterogeneous 
agents is considered. R\ is usually identified as land but it should be kept in 
mind that this is not necessarily the case.
5.3 H om ogeneous A gents
5.3.1 C om m ons
When R\ is not privatized, L agents working on R\ are paid their average 
product »£).' . This implies that there is a full tragedy of the commons 
on R i and that labor is overallocated to R\.
In equilibrium the payoffs are equalized across resources. The equilibrium 
quantity of labor Lc solves the equation3:
Y (K , Lc)ij)(Lc)
Lc 9  ^ '
5.3 .2  P rivate  property
In this section, privatization where land is distributed equally among L 
individuals, with 0  < L < L, is investigated. Note that with homogeneous 
agents the value of L does not affect any result because of the constant returns 
to scale assumption. In particular the case where land is distributed only to 
individuals who used to work on Ri (i.e. to Lc agents) leads to the same 
equilibrium wage than the perfectly egalitarian case where L — L.
Each agent receives a parcel of size A of R\. Individuals working on R\ 
(now privately owned) earn the wage w. Output on each parcel is given by
3This is true only for interior equilibrium. If there is only a corner equilibrium, it does 
not change the results, but labour allocation can be identical under both regimes.
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(5.1)
Y ( f , 1)^(1^), with LP the quantity of labor on the private resource and I the 
quantity of labor that each owner decides to hire, labor is allocated to each 
parcel such that the marginal product M P  is equalized across the (identical) 
parcels, and the wage on the labor market is:
w(K, I / )  = M P (K , l , I / )  = ^ l ( Y ( j - , l ) i , ( I / ) )  (5.2)
=  Yl (j -, l )  i>(L”) = Yl{K, I / M L ”)
Note that each owner does not internalize the effect of an additional unit 
of labor on the externality. The last equality comes from the homogeneity of 
degree 1 of Y  and from I = ^  since all the parcels are identical.
Each individual owns some land such that he receives the rent Y (^ , l)'ip(IP)— 
wl. Earnings of a resource 1 owner are w(K, V)+jY(K , Lp)'4)(IJ>)—w(K, 1)1 and 
an interior equilibrium is such that the wage is the same on the two resources:
w(K,U>) = g{U>) (5.3)
The land market is assumed to be complete. Because of the constant re­
turns to scale assumption, homogeneous agents are indifferent between buying 
and selling land. The maximum price someone is willing to pay for land is 
equal to the minimum price a landowner is willing to sell his land for. One 
can innocuously (and realistically) assume that agents prefer to own some land 
rather than sell it, be landless and employed on the very same land. If it is 
the case then no transactions are observed on the land market. If it is not, 
then some transactions occur but apart from introducing inequality between 
landowners profits, it does not affect any other variables.
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Equilibrium
Note that (5.1) and (5.3) can be rewritten:
Y (K ,L ‘)
Yl (K,D>)
1
Y(K ,L ) Yl (K,L) VL by concavity of Y.
A major factor influencing equilibrium is the ratio ^  j  (L). This measures 
the relative importance of the negative externality to the payoff on the common 
resource. Its characteristic affecting equilibrium is its variation with L. The
When people are allocated to the privatized resource, this decreases the 
negative externality and so increases the payoff on R\ but at the same time 
it makes production on R 2 more profitable. This in turn rises the equilibrium 
wage, reducing profits on R\. A key consequence in equilibrium of the interde­
pendency between the two resources is that there is a tradeoff between a low 
level of externality and a cheap labor. If ( ? )  < 0 , then the gain in production 
due to the reduced negative externality is always smaller than the increase in 
the payoff on the non-privatized resource. In other words, ip is less elastic 
than g with respect to L. This implies that the rise in the equilibrium wage 
will offset the gains from the reduced externality when labor allocation on Ri
that is there is no externality on land of overexploitation on the remaining
next sections consider the two cases < 0  and > 0 4.
increases. Two important special cases of < 0 is first when ip is constant
4 The case =  0 leads to the same conclusions.
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Figure 5.1: Equilibrium with homogeneous agents and ( ^ ) < 0.
CPR. Second, if ip > 0 is relaxed and t}) < 0 is allowed, then < 0. Thus 
this paragraph deals with negative but not too elastic (to have < 0)
externalities and positive externalities.
Starting from the common equilibrium labor allocation, the corresponding 
marginal product of labor under private regime is too low compared to the 
payoff on R 2. This too low marginal product induces workers to move to R 2, 
until payoffs on the two resources are equalized.
The proof is straightforward from the equilibrium conditions. Graphically, 
we have the following situation5:
In this case, allocating labor to R \ reduces proportionately more the neg­
ative externality than it increases the payoff on R 2. 'ip is more sensitive to L  
than g. A  possible situation is illustrated by Figure 5.2.
5Note that the convexity of the two increasing curves is not determined but that this 
does not affect the result.
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1Figure 5.2: Equilibrium with homogeneous agents and > 0.
When ^  j  > 0 unicity of the equilibrium is not guaranteed any more. On 
Figure 5.2, there are three equilibria but only two are stable. Consider the 
equilibrium labelled 2. If L  increases from this equilibrium, payoff on R \ is 
higher than payoff on 7?2- In other words, the marginal (or average in the case 
of common held property) product of labor is higher than the wage given by 
g(L). Therefore more labor is allocated to R\ until the payoffs are equalized 
in equilibrium 3. The same analysis holds if L is decreased from equilibrium 
2: the marginal product is too low and equilibrium 1 is finally reached.
Since > 0, a larger L  means tha t the gain due to the reduced ex­
ternality is always larger than the change in the market wage. Therefore as 
long as this relative gain compensates for the decreasing marginal (or average) 
product, it is better to increase N . This is what happens when moving from 
equilibrium 2 to 3. A similar reasoning holds for a move from 2 to 1: ip falls
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relatively more than g, therefore L  must keep on decreasing to reach a new 
equilibrium. This also implies that equilibria 1 and 3 are stable.
It is easy to construct graphically an example such that there is a stable 
equilibrium under private but not under common regime. In this case it cannot 
be argued that IP > Lc. It must not be forgotten that L must be smaller than 
L. If there is a stable equilibrium that does not exist under common regime, 
then Lc =  L  is a common equilibrium (corner solution with (5.1) satisfied as 
an inequality) and it is stable. This still yields Lc > IP.
A final remark is that with multiple equilibria, it could be that the common 
equilibrium is in 1 whereas the private equilibrium is in 3. However, and 
without any formal argument, it is simply assumed that the population stays 
in the "same" equilibrium after the property rights change. Another argument 
could be that between two equilibria, the most Pareto efficient is always chosen. 
This would lead to a unique equilibrium where IP >  IP.
More labor is allocated to Ri under the common regime. Therefore the 
conclusion is similar to the case < 0 and this gives Proposition 5.1, valid 
for all values of .
P ro p o sitio n  5.1 More labor is allocated to the production of good 1 under 
CPR than under private regime and the return to labor is smaller after priva­
tization.
A direct consequence of Proposition 5.1 is that after privatization the com­
mon property resource is more depleted and income from this resource is 
smaller. However, all the agents now receive some income from the priva­
tized resource and it may be that overall they are better off. This point is 
investigated in the next section.
121
Welfare analysis
Welfare W  is defined in a utilitarian way as the sum of all the incomes in 
the population. Therefore under private regime W p — L \ jY (K , IP)'ip(IP) — w ^ \  +  
wL = Y (K , IP)'ip{IP)—wIP+wL. Under common regime W c =  L ,
Using (5.1) and (5.3),
w p -  W c = 7Tp -  L [g{Lc) -  g(Lp)\
where ttp = Y (K , IP)'ip(IP) — wLp is the total profit generated under private 
regime6. Privatization increases welfare for labor allocations such that
np > L [g(Lc) -  g(Lp)] (5.4)
This can be illustrated graphically by considering both sides of (5.4) as 
functions of L/  and taking Lc as given. It should be noted first that if R 2 was 
not congested, privatization would always increase welfare. It would create 
landownership rents and allocate optimally labor between the two resources, 
without changing the return to labor. This is why congestion is the driving 
force behind the results.
For some given values of parameters, Lc is fixed and it is known that 
IP < L C, but not exactly how far IP is from Lc. All the values IP G [0, Lc\ are 
valid candidates for the optimal private labor allocation. The right hand side 
of (5.4) is decreasing in IP and equal to zero when IP = Lc. Furthermore it 
can be shown by differentiation that np increases with IP7, with ttp(0) — 0.
The two curves must intersect. This implies that there always exists a L
6 Since IP  does not depend on L, it does not depend on land allocation.
7First, there is here abuse of notation. IP  must be considered as a simple variable, 
and not as the private regime equilibrium. Second, this proof is straightforward =
-Jjj; (Yip — Yli/jL) =  (Y — L Y l)  ip — LYll^P > 0  by concavity of Y.
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W p < W C I  W p >
Figure 5.3: Welfare
such that VZ/ with LP < L  (resp. LP > L), W p < W c is satisfied (resp. 
W p > W °). (5.4) means that welfare increases after privatization if the total 
landownership rent is large enough to compensate for the fall in all the wages. 
It cannot be argued tha t welfare increases if privatization does not reduce labor 
allocation on the privatized resource by a  large amount, as could be wrongly 
inferred from the diagram (to change LP one must change the model parameters 
and this in turn affects L). Actually a large difference between L c and LP can 
be beneficial if it increases profits a lot. Depending on the parameters of the 
model, there may be a tradeoff between a loss in wages and a larger profit. 
The appendix provides numerical examples to illustrate different cases.
P ro p o sitio n  5.2 The change in welfare is ambiguous, as the fall in  wages 
may be compensated by larger profits. A privatization with a large impact on 
labor allocation, hence a large fa ll in wages, may actually increase welfare by 
having a large positive impact on profits.
It has been proved that privatization changes labor allocation and thereby 
increases the depletion of i?,2- Furthermore it may be that it decreases welfare,
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i.e. the sum of all the incomes in the population, even in the case where land 
distribution is perfectly equitable.
The assumptions of homogeneous agents and perfectly egalitarian privati­
zation are quite restrictive and the next section relaxes them.
5.4 H eterogeneous agents
In this section, agents can have two skill levels 7  ^ and 7 z to produce good 
1 (with 7  ^ > 7 /)8. There are Nh agents with high skills. This skill differential 
is only relevant for the production of good 1 and it affects both productivity 
as a worker and landowner talent. A highly skilled agent is not only more 
productive when working on Ri but his landowning has also a positive effect 
on the production of the resource exploitation.
In this setting a low skilled individual may benefit from selling or renting 
out its plot to a more productive agent. However, these two possibilities are 
ruled out in the analysis. Bans on sales of redistributed land are actually 
part of some existing land reforms (see for instance Banerjee 2000, who also 
provides the motivation for these restrictions). The impossibility can be the 
result of contracting difficulties that imply a cost larger than the benefit of 
renting. However, if it is possible to rent land, the welfare analysis in Section 
6  provides an indication of what welfare would be in that case.
Production function is changed to take into account skills Y  =  K aH l~a 
where H  is the amount of skills used to produce output, and a  < 1.
All the proposition proofs are in the appendix.
8These skills are due to some market imperfection not precised here. These may come 
from borrowing constraints on capital markets for instance.
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5.4 .1  C om m ons
In this part, the analysis is restricted to the case where in equilibrium 
all the agents and some of the <yl agents work on R\. The distribution of 
skills maximising welfare under common regime is usually not this one. Lc, 
and usually welfare, are decreasing with the number of 7  ^ types on R\. The 
intuition is that a r)h type is more productive on R\ but equally productive on 
Equilibrium is reached with a smaller number of individuals on R\ and 
this decreases the payoff of each agent9. Therefore to consider that all the 
agents work on R\ actually reduces the benefit of the CPR regime. The 
optimal skill distribution would make the result that privatization may not be 
beneficial even stronger. 10
When Nh agents with high skills and N  agents with low skills work on good 
1 , the payoff for a 7  agent on good 1 is given by:
•- * ' ( # , N hi h + N ^ M N h  + N ) = i K a{Nhlh + N ^ ^ L )  (5.5)
Nhlh +  n 7 i
Therefore a more skilled agent is able to extract a higher share of output 
from the total output.
In equilibrium, payoffs between R\ and R2 are equalized and
y lK a(Nh'rh+ N 'r,)-a^ (L ) = g(L) ^  (L ) =  ( N ^ + N ^ y  (5.6)
9 This does not happen with certainty for 7^ agents as for a given L° they lose earnings 
by moving to R2 since they earn ^ g{L°) on R\  and only g(Lc) on R2. However the increase 
in L c to reach the new equilibrium compensates (partially or totally) this negative effect.
10To justify that all the 7^ agents are on R i,  one can think about the following argument: 
start with a given skills distribution across the two resources with some number N  >  0  of 
7/j individuals on i?2- The same number of 71 individuals on R \  would agree to switch with 
them. The low skilled types would not change their payoff, whereas the high skilled would 
(apparently a Pareto improvement). They would agree only if they do not anticipate that 
this shift of workers would change the equilibrium, resulting in a smaller L c and consequently 
in a smaller payoff for the low skilled. If they do not, then the resulting distribution is that 
all the 7/j individuals work on Ri  (assuming that Nh <  L c).
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5.4 .2  P rivate P rop erty
Skills influence both the productivity of the worker and of the landowner: 
a 7  worker is paid 7 w and a 7  landowner hiring labor maximizes 7r =  7  ( ^ ) a hl~' 
wh with h = l i  (this type of production function is similar to the one used 
in Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny 1991)11. Therefore the skill of the landowner 
influences the whole production. Private regime is thus assumed to give the 
opportunity to use the skill more productively. This is to allow for the pro­
ductivity gains usually associated to privatization. A landowner hires his own 
labor, therefore he earns a wage and a landownership rent.
First is investigated privatization where only 7 h agents are landowners 
and such that in equilibrium h > 7  ^ (i.e. landowners want to hire nh(> 
0) 7 j workers). This makes heterogeneity in skills less relevant but helps to 
understand the main features of the model before turning to the general case.
The quantity of labor on R\ is L = Nh +  Nhfih. Landowners maximize 
their profits such that:
max 7T = >  7 /i(l -  01) h~a^{L )  =  w (5.7)
By assumption h = r)h +  implying that the optimal satisfies
h w  =  g(L) 7 | (1 -  a ) j hK a ( ^  ) (L) -  {Nhl h +  A/.n^ ) 0  (5.8)
(5.6) and (5.8) define the equilibrium labor allocation under both regimes.
n I could assume more generally that the production function is m {7) (77)** h1_a^(L) 
with m'(7) > 0  but I take the symphfying assumption that 772(7) — 7 - This does not change 
radically the results and makes them much simpler.
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/< 0 and 7^(1 — a) <Figure 5.4: Equilibrium with heterogeneous agents,
1 .
5.4.3 Com parison betw een  private and com m on prop­
erty equilibrium
&)'<«
This section and the next one are very similar to Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 
but the figures are presented in a slightly different way12.
At the common equilibrium labor allocation, private equilibrium cannot 
be sustained because the marginal product is smaller than the wage given by 
payoff on R 2. Workers move to the commons. By doing so they reduce the 
wage by a greater amount than the externality and marginal product on R i 
increases. Private property equilibrium is reached when marginal product and 
wage are equal.
If the share of labor 1 — a  is not too high and/or if the landowner is not
12 Note that on the vertical axis of the next diagrams ha >  0 . This is not true for L =  0  
and these graphs should be seen as starting for L =  Nh- The complete graph of ha would 
have a discontinuity in the slope at L =  Nh as landowners start hiring 7Z workers for L >  Nh. 
If the equilibrium is at L <  Nh this implies that no ryl workers are hired but it does not 
affect the main result.
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too skilled then 7 Z workers are worse off because they earn a smaller wage and 
overexploitation of 1?2 is more severe after privatization. The fall in labor de­
mand is larger if the share of labor 1 — a  is low. If landowners are highly skilled 
(7 fc high), this may compensate this effect. Finally, note that the equilibrium 
is stable: if L is increased from the equilibrium, the marginal product of labor 
will be lower than the wage on 1?2 and workers are going to reallocate to this 
resource, coming back to the equilibrium. Looking at this means that when 
L rises, the increase is proportionately larger in g than in ifr. Therefore the fall 
in the negative externality is too small compared to the change in the market 
wage.
(?)' > 0
When ( 5 )  > 0 multiple equilibria are possible. However, like in Section 
3.2.3, instable equilibria can be ruled out and the result that privatization 
reduces labor allocation still holds.
On Figure 5.5, equilibrium 2 is unstable. Increasing L will induce more 
people to move to the privatized resource because congestion proportionately 
increases less than the benefits from the externality. Similarly, decreasing L 
will make more people work on the common property resource because payoff 
on R-2 falls less than the marginal product on R\.
In a stable equilibrium it is always true that IP < L°.
These results are summarized in Proposition 5.2.
P ro p o sitio n  5.3 I f  landowners’ skill and the share of labor are such that 
7 Z(1  — a) < 1 then more labor is allocated to a resource under 'common regime.
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Figure 5.5: Equilibrium with heteregenous agents, ^  j  >  0 and 7^(1 — a) < 1.
Note tha t it is also possible to have an equilibrium under commons (resp. 
private property) that does not exist under private property (resp. commons) 
as in Figure 5.6. However using the same argument than in Section 3.2.3, the 
stable equilibrium with the highest labor allocation (if it exists) is always a 
common property equilibrium.
The main result of this section is tha t as long as labor share and skills are 
not too high privatization reduces wages and depletes the common property 
resource. This holds regardless of j .  Consider also the case where ^ is non­
monotonic. There are multiple equilibria but stable equilibria are all such that 
I f  < L c. This is shown on Figure 5.7 where only equilibrium 1 and 2 are 
stable.
However only a partial privatization with all 7h being landowners and all 
7j being landless has been considered. A natural question to ask is whether a 
more or less egalitarian privatization can lead to better outcomes.
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NFigure 5.6: Alternative outcome
Figure 5.7: Multiple equilibria
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5.5 M ore egalitarian privatization
In this section, all the 7  ^ types and iVj low skilled agents are landowners.
t
Only locally stable equilibria are considered. This implies that with 4> = ^ , 
can be negative or positive but not too large (as is illustrated by Figure 5.5, 
a formal condition for stability is given in the appendix). Before investigating 
the consequences of a more egalitarian privatization, a few important points 
must be made.
As in the common regime, the skill distribution over the two resources is 
not neutral. Would welfare be increased if it was assumed that some high skill 
agents (but not all) and some strictly positive number of low skilled agents were 
landowners? For a given number of 7 z landowners, it can be shown that both 
IP and welfare increase with the number of 7  ^ landowners. Thus optimally, 
each r)h individuals should be given some land. It is what is assumed in the 
following section. Remember that under common property, the minimizing 
welfare skill distribution has been considered. Hence the worst (looking at 
welfare) common property regime is compared to the best private property 
regime.
5.5 .1  Labor dem ands
Let rii be the number of workers a 7 Z landowner hires. Proposition 5.3 is 
derived by maximizing profits for the two types of landowners:
P ro p o sitio n  5.4 labor demand is increasing with skills and a more egalitarian 
privatization has a larger effect (in absolute terms) on highly skilled landowners 
labor demand.
This proposition says how a more egalitarian privatization affects labor 
allocation. It suggests that adding one more 7 Z landowner will have a stronger
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impact on the labor demand of 7  ^ landowners. However this does not give 
any indication of the total change in labor demand. More precisely, we do not 
know whether the labor demand of the new landowner can compensate for the 
loss in all the other labor demands. A careful analysis can provide the answer.
It is useful to notice first that without any inequality ^  This
means that all the landowners adjust their labor demand such that the total 
labor allocation on Ri does not change (i.e. ^  =  0). This is a consequence 
of the constant returns to scale assumption. Therefore in this case more egali­
tarian privatization does not affect wages and depletion of R2. If 7  ^ > 7 /, this 
does not hold any more and different effects must be considered:
• When land is divided (Ni higher) the most direct effect is a pure negative 
size effect: parcel area is smaller. This reduces labor demand.
• The second effect is induced by the change in j  due to the establishment 
of a new landowner hiring people. This reflects the consequence on ^ 
of taking one agent from R2 and giving him some land where he hires a 
quantity nz of 7 Z agents. Abstracting from all the other effects, if ( ? )  < 
0  then the benefit of reducing the negative externality is overcompensated 
by the increase in the wage on f t  and this effect is negative. If ( * ) '  > 0, 
it is positive.
These two effects can be added together to get the (partial) net impact 
of having one more landowner. It is the result of this new landowner hiring 
people minus the size effect. For a stable equilibrium, this sum is always 
negative. If ( ? )  <  0  then this is clear: by hiring new workers, the increase 
in wage is higher than the gain from the smaller externality and this decreases 
labor demand. If is positive but small to ensure stability then it is not 
large enough to compensate for the size effect and the same result holds. This
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does not take into account inequality and simply reflects the additional labor 
demand of the new landowner, adjusted for the new parcel size.
After the more egalitarian privatization, each landowner sees his parcel size 
shrink and observes the new landowner hiring workers and therefore affecting 
L. This always decreases labor demand. Then, he notices that each landowner 
(including him) adjusts his labor demand because of the change in L. This in 
turn affects L and labor demands adjust, etc.... The process is very similar to 
a reaction function and provides a multiplier to the two first effects. This is 
the third effect.
• Since all the labor demands are affected, each landowner observes the 
change in L and changes again his labor demand until equilibrium is 
reached. If there is no inequality then this exactly compensates the 
second effect and the only observable consequence of a more egalitarian 
privatization is the size effect. With inequality, landowners react more 
than 7 j landowners and this introduces an asymmetry.
If ( * )  < 0, the fall in all the labor demands actually makes the change 
in L  less harmful: L decreases, increasing This positive effect will 
decrease the size of the fall of each landowner labor demand since it 
makes the situation better compared to the one with only the two first 
effects. It mitigates the second negative effect because with inequality 
landowners react more strongly than /yl landowners. Therefore the 
multiplier is smaller than 1.
u  ( f )  > 0, the opposite occurs and this increases the fall in labor 
demand: a smaller L decreases 'tp more than g and this implies a further 
fall in labor demands. Again, only inequality drives this result. 
landowners axe more sensitive to a change in L. Therefore the effect is 
negative and completely cancels the benefits of the positive second effect.
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The multiplier is greater than 1.
P ro p o sitio n  5.5 A more egalitarian privatization always decreases labor de­
mand in a locally stable equilibrium.
I f  < 0 then inequality makes the fall smaller than it is without in­
equality.
I f  ( | )  > 0 then inequality makes the fall greater than it is without in- 
equality.
5.5 .2  Labor a llocation  on  th e  privatized  resource
More interesting is the change in the labor allocation L on R \. Remember that 
without inequality L is not affected. Again with inequality, the total effect can 
be broken down in three parts similar to those used for the change in labor 
demands.
• Firstly, two negative parcel size effects have to be considered depending 
on the landowner skill. These are the two size effects already found in 
the labor demands ni and n^-
• Secondly, the new landowner hires labor and this increases labor alloca­
tion on R \ . This does not take into account the change in labor demands 
from all the landowners. This has a positive impact on L.
Overall, these two effects decrease L. This is only due to the skill differential 
between landowners. Starting from a given population of landowners composed 
of all the 7  ^and of some of the 7 Z individuals, if one more 7 l landowner is added, 
his labor demand does not compensate for the fall in all the labor demands due 
to the smaller parcel size. This happens because labor demand from highly 
skilled individuals falls more than labor demand from low skilled landowners. 
Note that this does not have anything to do with congestion or externality.
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• Thirdly, the change in labor demands affects L  through If ( ! )  < °> 
this mitigates the negative effect by making it smaller in absolute value. 
This is very similar to the analysis for rfy. The first two effects decrease 
L and this is actually beneficial for all the landowners. Therefore they 
hire more labor and even though the total effect is still negative, it is 
smaller. On the other hand, if ( ! )  >  0 the fall in L  is amplified.
In other words, an increase in the number of 7 1 landowners first decreases 
L by reducing parcel size (the labor demand from the new landowners not 
compensating fully this effect). Then, if ( ! )  <  0 this fall in L reduces 
equilibrium wage relatively to the negative externality, reducing the total fall 
in L. If ( j )  > 0 the fall in L increases equilibrium wage relatively to the 
negative externality, increasing the total fall in L.
Finally, if the skill ratio increases, the fall in L  is larger. Again, if r)h 
is much larger than 7  ^ the fall in r)h landowners labor demands is large and 
cannot be compensated by the much smaller labor demand from the new 7 Z 
landowner.
P ro p o sitio n  5.6 A more egalitarian privatization always decreases labor al­
location and the non-privatized resource is more degraded. I f  there is no skill 
differential then L is fixed.
I f  < 0 then inequality makes the fall in L smaller than it is without 
inequality.
I , (;)' > 0 *< W  in L ,nnu i, «
inequality.
For a given 7 ^ the larger is the skill ratio, the larger is the decrease in L.
Note that this proposition does not assume anything on 7 ^ ( 1  — a). From 
Section 4 when 7 ^ ( 1  — a) > 1 and Ni =  0 labor allocation on Ri is larger after
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privatization. However if the privatization is more egalitarian then 1? falls and 
may actually become smaller than L°. Even in the case where privatization is 
profitable, this may not hold any more if land is allocated to many low skilled 
individuals.
5.5 .3  P rofits on  th e  privatized  resource
Profits are affected by a more egalitarian privatization. From profit max­
imization, using (5.7) and (5.8):
When privatization is more egalitarian, it is not obvious whether profits 
increase or not. However (5.9) combined with Propositions 5.4 and 5.5 provides 
a clear answer. When the number of 7 / landowners rise, both n/ and g(L) fall. 
Therefore profits fall as well13.
P ro p o sitio n  5.7 A more egalitarian privatization always decreases profits on 
the privatized resource for both types of agents.
To understand this, note that (5.9) can be written:
When Ni increases, hi — (l-\-ni)'yl falls as well by Proposition 5.4. Overall 
7r/ falls because whi decreases more slowly than the first term in (5.10). This 
is basically due to the concavity of production in labor.
1 — a (5.9)
(5.10)
13 Note however that income inequality between landowners and landless fall.
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All the landowners see both their landownership rent fall and their incomes 
as workers fall. Consequently landowners and landless incomes fall but the 
income change for people who used to be landless and have been given some 
land must be also taken into account. This requires the welfare analysis of a 
more egalitarian privatization.
5 .5 .4  W elfare analysis
Welfare W p is the sum of all the incomes in the population. Even though 
they fall after a more egalitarian privatization W p could increase due to the 
allocation of landownership rents to a larger number of people. If it is the case, 
then land should be given to the largest number of people as this makes the 
population better off. However, it can be proved that this is never the case. 
To give land to low skilled landowners always decreases W p.
P ro p o sitio n  5.8 A more egalitarian privatization always decreases welfare.
When there is no inequality in skills then W p does not depend on Ni and 
a more equal land distribution does not affect welfare.
Propositions 5.4 to 5.7 establish that a more egalitarian privatization inten­
sifies depletion of the common property resource, reduces incomes of landless 
and landowners profits in such a way that new landowners would not be able 
to compensate former landowners and landless for the loss in their income. 
This emphasizes that if land is given without distinction in skills it may have 
some serious adverse effects.
5.6 Less egalitarian privatization
The case of a more egalitarian privatization has been examined and it has 
been proved that this may have negative consequences. Thus it is of interest
137
to investigate the effects of a less egalitarian reform, where only some of the 
high skills agents receive a parcel of land. This case is actually very similar to 
the homogeneous agents situation of Section 3.
This section also gives an indication of welfare when land can be rented 
out to highly skilled individuals. In this case, welfare will be at most equal 
to welfare obtained with only high skills landowners. The rents paid are only 
transfers and do not affect welfare. It can be smaller if there is some efficiency 
loss due to the renting contract.
Only N  7 ^-agents (N  < Nh) are assumed to be landowners and it is as­
sumed that h > V7V £ [1, iV/J. This implies that landowners are
always willing to hire 7 Z workers. Finally, the simplifying assumption that 
each landowner hires the same quantity of /yh workers is made. More precisely, 
this quantity is NhjfN (or ^  including himself). This makes the labor force 
composition identical across parcels.
Let’s consider that N  increases. Because of the constant returns to scale 
and the homogeneity of skills across landowners, labor demands decrease only 
by Similarly, the increase in N  does not affect L.
Welfare is not affected by a less egalitarian privatization. Since L does 
not change, the equilibrium wage is constant and 7 ; agents are neither better 
off nor worse off. On the other hand, to give land to a larger number of 
high skills landowners merely represents a transfer of money between these 
landowners. The former landowners have a smaller income but this fall is 
exactly compensated by the landownership rents of the new landowners.
P ro p o sitio n  5.9 A less egalitarian privatization affects neither labor alloca­
tion on the privatized resource nor welfare.
Propositions 5.5 and 5.8 imply that the maximum L  is reached for N  <
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(and i?2 degradation is minimized, and wage is maximized) and Propositions 
5.7 and 5.8 that W p is maximized for N  < Nh.
W p for Nh landowners and W c can be compared in a very similar fashion 
than in Section 3.2.4. This yields a comparable condition for W p to be greater 
than W cU:
The graph derived from this condition is as in Figure 5.3 and gives the same 
conclusion. Note that from Proposition 5.7 L increases with JVj, implying that 
the larger is 7Vj, the more difficult it is to increase welfare by land titling.
5.7 Influence o f inequality
The impact on labor allocation of a change in skills is now examined. Skills 
have been broadly defined and policies could influence them. For instance, 
they could be the consequence of borrowing constraints preventing individuals 
from buying high quality inputs, or of professional formation, access to new 
techniques, etc... The differential in 7  between individuals could therefore 
be reduced (or increased) and this will have an influence on the equilibrium 
variables.
The effect on L is investigated.
P ro p o sitio n  5.10 A rise in 7 Z or in 7  ^ increases labor allocation to the pri­
vatized resource.
Looking at welfare, it can be easily established that a larger 7  ^ increases 
welfare W p. However this is not necessarily true for a larger 7 Z. This is because 
14Note that for j h =  ryl this is (5 .4 ).
Nhwh(IS) > \g(Lc) -  g(If)}
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when 7 Z increases skilled landowners are relatively less paid as workers (looking 
at the partial effect not accounting for the change in L) since they earn ^ g (L ).  
If the rise in L is small then the total effect on W p may be negative, because 
high skills are relatively less paid. This does not occur when 7 h increases 
because this makes 7  ^ wages higher and does not affect r)l wages that are 
always equal to g(L) in equilibrium. On the other hand, a rise in 7 / or 
increases W°. Therefore a positive change in skills is always beneficial under 
common property regime.
Proposition 5.9 shows that if privatization leads to an increase in fyl then 
the result that IP < Lc may not hold. Therefore a strict privatization may 
not be profitable but may become an improvement if accompanied by other 
measures increasing the lowest skills.
5.8 C onclusion
This chapter argues that the privatization of a resource may have far reaching 
implications. Individual titling is beneficial when considering the resource in 
particular, but not necessarily if the whole environment is looked upon. One of 
the main result is that welfare does not necessarily increase after privatization, 
even when land reform is perfectly egalitarian. The lessons derived from this 
simple model are quite straightforward.
First, the beneficial nature of privatization in itself, to solve over exploita­
tion, contains the seed of its potentially negative consequence. A shift of labor 
is not neutral. This calls for a careful and complete investigation of labor 
allocation when a change in property rights is advocated. When the outside 
opportunity is congested then it may be better to have a non optimal situation 
on the resource. This is a second best solution. To solve a distortion may lead
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to a worse outcome if there is another distortion (in this chapter the congestion 
externality on the remaining resource).
Second, the design of resource titling is not neutral. A conclusion of this 
chapter is that land should be given to the most able individuals. A more 
egalitarian distribution unambiguously decreases welfare. But in reality, it 
is usually difficult, or simply impossible, to identify skilled individuals when 
defining land rights. The market should then be allowed to allocate optimally 
labor through rental and sale. This article has precisely ruled out this possi­
bility to have a clean analysis of a given land distribution. Banerjee (2000) has 
already underlined the absence of good reasons to restrict land rental, while 
he showed that there may be for sales. By allowing less able people to rent out 
their plot, land reform keeps its redistributive goal while maximising the gains 
from the reform. Looking at welfare, the use of a strictly utilitarian welfare 
function has the merit of being simple and to give some clear conclusions, how­
ever it has the serious drawback of disregarding inequality. Even though the 
sum of incomes is maximised by giving land only to skilled individuals, it also 
increases inequality compared to a more egalitarian distribution. A welfare 
function with inequality aversion may not support the strong result that low 
skilled people should not be given any land.
Third, the result that privatization reduces labor allocation does not hold 
when landowners skills are high. This assumes that privatization is potentially 
beneficial. Better ownership security, access to credit market through the use 
of land as a collateral, are arguments usually used in favour in privatization 
(Feder and Noronha 1987, Noronha 1997). This is why it is assumed in the 
model that privatization allows agents to use their skill both as a worker (as 
in the CPR situation) and a landowner. The model shows that these skills 
should be as high as possible to promote land reform. In the case where land is 
given to individuals of both types ( “more egalitarian privatization”), the skill
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ratio should be minimized to reduce the fall in labor allocation. Hence the 
conclusion that land should be given only to skilled individuals does not mean 
that privatization must necessarily be inegalitarian. It rather stresses that 
skills should be made as equal and as high as possible across the population. 
Land reform should seek to promote these skills in order to fully exploit the 
benefits of land titling.
5.9 A ppendix
5.9 .1  A  sim ple m odel o f  con gested  resource
This model shows that g(L) and 'ip(L) increase with L. Consider that each 
agent i can work on R2 by exerting effort ez. Let’s denote E  =  JT  e*. Total 
output on R2 is given by (A — E )E , where A  is some positive constant.
Each agent receives the payoff ^  (A — E) E  = ei(A — E). It is assumed 
for simplicity that the cost of extracting the resource is zero. In equilibrium 
all the individuals choose the same optimal level of effort e that maximizes 
e(A — E).
Maximization yields e =  and g{L) =  e(A — E) =  ( X -l+i)  •
Therefore g'{L) > 0 and the resource is congested.
Total effort is given by E  — ^ - l + i  an<^  ^  is decreasing in L.
This shows that a larger number of people working on R\ decreases total 
effort on R 2 and therefore decreases the negative externality, implying 'ip'(L) > 
0 .
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5.9 .2  W elfare analysis
This section gives a simple example of welfare analysis in the case of homoge­
neous agents. It starts from the remark that in the limit case where L° =  LP, 
W° — W p. In the general case where Lc > LP, it is not obvious how Figure 5.3 
changes with parameters and how this affects welfare. In particular, is it that 
the limit case is the only case where W° =  W P1 This example shows that it 
may be not.
A simple case with Y (K ,L )  = ^p(L) = L&, and g(L) =  L7, with
P  <  7  is considered.
Solving for the equilibrium,
LP =
LP =  (1 — a )a-P+^  Lc
The parameter to be changed is the capital share a. When a  =  0, L° = LP 
and therefore W° =  W p. I will show that W c — W p is not monotonic in a  and 
that a large Lc — IP can be beneficial to privatization.
Two numerical examples are given, in both cases L = 35 and K  — 50. 
The graph of L° and LP is very similar in both cases and shows that Lc — LP 
(distance between the two curves) increases with a. .
In the first case, with (3 =  0.2 and 7  =  0.5, privatization is always welfare 
damaging as is illustrated by the graph of W p — W c.
In this case, as Lc — LP increases, the gain in profits is not large enough to 
compensate for the fall in wages.
In the second one, with (3 = 0.1 and 7  =  0.2, there are some values for a 
such that W c < W p. The graph of W p — W c is
In this case, if the labor share 1 — a  is not too large and not too close
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Figure 5.8: Labour allocations under private and common regime














Figure 5.10: W p -  W c
to zero, then privatization is beneficial. One could expect that a large labor 
share is necessary to have W p > W c as it minimizes the transfer of labor to 
the congested resource. This is not true as a not too large labor share is good 
for profits. In this example, labor intensive activities should not be privatized 
while less intensive one should be (if the labor share is very close to 0  then 
privatization again loses its advantage because Lp and np converge to zero).
This simple example shows that privatization may or may not be wel­
fare improving.
5.9.3 Proofs o f th e propositions
P ro o f of P roposition  5.3
From (5.7) skilled labor demand hi for a landowner (i = h, I) is such 
that 7 i( l —a) (77)° h^aip(L) = w. Hence ^  By definition hi — 'yi+ni/yl.
I
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This yields (5.11). (5.12) follows immediately.
. ('YhV" lh . „nh = ( — I ni +  I — 1 ----> ni
h )  \ 7  iJ 7i
(5.11)
dnh
=  f - ) i
dni > dni
dNi \ 7 (  / d ^ dNi
(5.12)
Note that since in equilibrium 7 tw = g(L), the implicit expressions for ni 
and rih are:
ni =  7*
nh = h
( 1 \ ^( ! - « ) - I - (5.13)
(5.14)
P ro o f o f P rop osition  5.4
The condition under which an equilibrium is stable must be given, ni 
is defined by the implicit equation (5.13). Stability requires that the derivative 
of the right hand side of (5.13) is smaller than 1. Differentiating and using 
L  =  (1  +  nh)Nh +  (1 +  ni)Ni yields
(j) l a  
<!> < N 1 +  m ( % y N h + Nt
(5.15)
(?) w-
Proposition 5.4 can now be proven. 
Differentiating (5.13) with respect to IVj,
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dni
dN, =  (1  +  ni)




ysecond effect: new landowner hiring workers and therefore affecting L  e^ec ;^ Parcel size j
+ I ± ^ ( Nh^  + Nl! t L ) £  (5.16)
a  \  d N i  d N i  J  (f)
>------------------V------------------ '
third effect: change in all the labor demands affecting L
This explains the decomposition in three effects, with an always negative 
size effect, the influence of new landowner hiring people and finally the adjust­
ment of all the labor demands affecting in return each labor demand.
Note that since by stability 
the first two effects is always negative. 
(5.16) can be rewritten using (5.12):
< 1 a N  1+71 j , the sum of
dni
dNi




= A dm \m l .
(5.17)
with A  -
1 l+n; 0
N  a  <b
J l+^ f
N  a & y
— is a positive multiplier for stable equilib­
ria and ( )  the change in n/ when 7  ^ =  7 /. If 4- > 0 (resp. < 0), or
'  ‘ '  7h=7l
equivalently ( ? )  > 0 (resp. < 0), then A > 1 (resp. A  < 1 ).
This proves Proposition 5.4.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  5.5
With a more egalitarian privatization, L =  +  N^n^ +  Ni +  N[Ui.
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Using the expressions for ni and gives:
L = Nh + N h
Nt + Nt
7h (! -  ° 0 9\










1 +  71/
=  (ni +  1 )
second effect: new landowner s.
7h\  Q Nh_Nj.  
l i )  N  N ^
V
first effect: parcel size
+ a 7h 1 ^  +  Nih  '
$ dL 
~$dNi
third effect: change in labor demands affect L
' l _ ( v
1 -
r
l  +  n z
V 7  u a
^ 1  n „ + n ,
l l
(f> dL 
J d N i
(5.19)
(5.19) can be written
dL
m
= -  (nt +  1 ) Nh t e ) ! -N 1 - ^ 1  l ^ ) ‘ Nh + N, £.
— r —
Proposition 5.5 holds since > 1 and 1— ° Nh +  iVj
from (5.15). Note also that = 0 when 'yh = 7  
Finally, inequality in skills increases the fall in L,
d / d ,L \  +d





P ro o f o f P rop osition  5 .7
W p is defined as the sum of all the incomes in the population, com­
posed of 7  ^ landowners earning 7 and the wage -^g(L), of 7 Z landowners 
earning ni and the wage g(L), and of workers earning g(L). Hence W p =
Nh Vh +  ^g( L) ]  +N,  [tt, +  g(L)]+g(L) (L  -  JV, -  N h) =  I Nh ( ^ )  " +  N, 
'L +  Nh ( ^ - l ) ] g ( L ) .
Taking the derivative yields:
7rjT
dWp





+  7TJ + L + Nh ( ^  -  1 




, , dni . \ ., _ \ dL





(ni +  1)<?(L) + g'(L)




T Z J v l  + N l  + l ^  + 1 }~  dlf7  [■N h'+N h n h + N i + N ln l 1 -  j k j
+ N h \ ^ \  + Nt 
7z
<0
o  . . ., . dL
(m +  1 )g (L )^ t t  +
l  — o dNi




Hence the result < 0 that proves Proposition 5.7.
Note also that r)h =  7 * implies ^  =  0 and this implies =  0.dNi
P ro o f o f  P rop osition  5.8
Assuming all the ryh agents are hired on the privatized resource, L =  
Nh +  N n h.
Assuming h > 7 ^  VAT £ [1, N h], we have h = l h^ + h n h =  7/i7z(! -  a) *
Hence =  7 Z a 7  ^(1 -  o) ^ A _  Ih Aa JV 7Z JV '







Profits on the privatized resource are given by 7r =  (n^ +  g{L)
| d'K __ __
1 d N  ~  N  ‘
This easily gives the result that ^  Ntt +  N h^ g (L )  +  (L -  ATh)p(L)j
0 .
P roof o f P rop osition  5.9
Prom (5.18), and differentiating L  with respect to 7 ;.
^ N h (n h + ^ ) +  2=aiJV, (n, +  1) +  NhdL_ 
d l ‘
Differentiating with respect to 7  ^ yields
dL 
d7h
(m + 1 ) #
iV/j——  [n ^  +  — (1
n OL Ih  L T'i
1 - ia («< +  ! )  i




This thesis has presented various aspects of how institutions shaped behaviors, 
and how in return these shaped institutions. Chapter 2  argued that institutions 
created an environment that defeated their primary purpose through cultural 
transmission. There is a feeling in this result that individuals free ride (though 
unwillingly in the model) on the institutions, and trust them to take care of 
behaviors. This is a mistake, and good institutions may result in a society 
plagued by bad behavior, with good but inefficient institutions. Chapter 3 
went a step further, and let institutions be chosen by individuals. Because of 
the same effect, now not only do institutions crowd out good behavior, but 
they also crowd themselves out. They initiate themselves the mechanism that 
undermines their own existence. However it is possible for cultural groups to 
control this process and create other institutions to affect cultural transmission. 
Education is done publicly because it helps to support a set of rules, and 
avoid crowding out. The idea that cultural groups could affect socialization 
is the starting point for Chapter 4. W hat are the mechanisms of cultural 
transmission, and how is it affected by group characteristics? The focus in 
this chapter shifts from institutions as rules for the society, to institutions 
as rules internal to each cultural group. Cultural groups could be tempted
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to minimize contacts with other cultures to avoid being "contaminated". By 
recognizing that children meet friends from other cultural groups, and that 
parents try to influence them in this choice, it appeared that intolerance is not 
always a good strategy for groups. In order to survive cultural transmission 
they should try  to have a very strong internal structure, and be open to other 
cultures. As in the preceding chapters, institutional design has to be finely 
tuned in order to promote a cultural trait. Chapter 5 builds on this idea and 
uses the prominent example of commons as an institutional failure. The right 
institution requires clear property rights, and privatization is a good reform to 
achieve the first best outcome. However it may be more complex in a second 
best world, where labor flows from one resource to the other. Privatization 
may have unfavorable consequences.
These chapters suggest several ways for future research. Social interactions 
play an important role in crowding out, particularly if one wants to study the 
formation of norms in a society. Chapter 2  provided a framework for doing so, 
but it might be valuable to further elaborate on the shape of these interactions. 
The inclusion of interactions in the political equilibrium of Chapter 3 would 
require further modifications, but would achieve the extension of the crowd­
ing out result. Cultural groups find it profitable to set up institutions that 
strategically affect socialization. I considered only the case where one group is 
allowed to do so, but clearly both groups can. The competition that it creates 
between groups has been left aside but it is surely of interest to understand how 
different cultural groups choose to affect socialization. Chapter 4 offers to look 
at the internal organization of groups. Parents try to influence their children 
but they could also collectively decide about the level of intolerance, or how to 
reach children external to the group, etc. There is a broad research agenda to 
be set in order to understand how cultures try to spread their ideas in a world 
with many different traits. The last ambitious extension of Chapter 4 is to use
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network theory to derive strong properties about equilibrium network prop­
erties. Cultural transmission has recently prompted some empirical research 
to check the predictions of the theory. The introduction of interactions, with 
the econometric challenges it raises, would complement the existing literature 
and provide further evidence on the consequences of sorting, either geograph­
ically, or by characteristics. Finally Chapter 5 makes predictions about the 
impact of privatization on the remaining commons and the returns to labor. 
An empirical investigation that looks at the level of resource depletion after 
privatization would validate or reject the theory.
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